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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The greatest foe of good tax reforms is the ambition to establish a 
perfect tax reform. 
This article proposes to reform the current income tax 
conventions that currently tax income generated from financial 
holdings and transactions (“financial income”) in the growing global 
finance industry. 
In promoting its proposal, the article advances both a descriptive 
argument and a normative one. The first, descriptive, argument traces 
the development of sourcing conceptions in the international income 
tax regime (IITR). It identifies policymakers’ growing readiness in 
recent years to reformulate the obsolete conventions according to 
which the financial income of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is 
allocated between sovereigns. The article claims that some of these 
reformulations, although still in their preliminary stages, may mark 
the beginning of a new Allocation Phase era in the IITR. In this era, 
the need to prevent abuse by MNEs may drive policymakers to 
consider abandoning current formalistic sourcing conventions. 
Instead, they may seek more administratively sound tax sourcing rules 
for financial transactions of MNEs that better adhere to the economic 
reality of the evolving global corporate business structure. 
The article’s second, normative, argument is that the main 
challenge for the IITR is to adequately source affiliated transactions 
occurring within integrated MNE business structures. The article 
focuses on financial transactions that take place in the integrated 
global financial market. This integrated setting makes it difficult for 
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tax authorities to rely on old sourcing conventions, which require 
using the arm’s-length standard and reporting transactions among 
affiliates as if they were priced and structured by unrelated parties. 
This idea of arm’s-length reporting is deficient where it is difficult to 
price the transactions or to validate their structure. This article focuses 
on the validation-of-structure problem, stressing that, in the case of 
finance, tax law has not come anywhere close to determining the 
“proper” structure of financial transactions. Tax law relies on legal 
formalism to categorize financial transactions, an approach that allows 
taxpayers considerable flexibility in controlling the tax consequences 
of these transactions. Thus, tax authorities’ attempts to prevent abuse 
by scrutinizing affiliated financial transactions through arm’s-length 
lenses cannot promote any policy objective of equitable or efficient 
taxation. This article contributes an innovative and comprehensive 
answer to this problem, arguing that, at least in the case of MNEs that 
are financial intermediaries (FMNEs) and earn primarily financial 
income, income should not be sourced through transactional arm’s-
length methods. Instead, the article suggests that FMNE financial 
income should be computed as a whole and then allocated to the 
different jurisdictions where it operates according to a formula. The 
formula it proposes relies on hard-to-manipulate factors that indicate 
the geographic location where FMNE financial income has been 
generated. These measures net the financial income of an FMNE and 
allocate it among the different jurisdictions in which it operates. The 
allocation should be done according to a formula employing immobile 
and difficult-to-manipulate indicators that track the volume of an 
FMNE’s activities in each jurisdiction in which it operates. 
Part II of the article puts the issue in context by presenting the 
basic structure of the IITR and the difficulties tax authorities face 
when seeking to tax financial income. This part then identifies the 
four key problems with the taxation of financial income: income 
shifting, deferral, excessive credit repatriation, and evasion. Part III 
develops the descriptive claim of the article. Following up on previous 
research,1 the article demonstrates policymakers’ growing readiness to 
admit the limitations of the arm’s-length approach and to consider 
new formulary allocation methods of sourcing MNEs’ financial 
income. The article substantiates this claim by examining recent 
developments in a number of thin-capitalization regimes and 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
 
 1 Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development 
of International Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631 (2008). 
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branch allocation guidelines. Part IV offers a proposal for sourcing 
financial income through formulary methods. To elucidate the 
principles of its proposal, this part assumes an “ideal” reality in which 
all MNE income is financial income, there is a multilateral agreement, 
and the boundaries of MNEs are not in dispute. Part V presents the 
article’s conclusions. 
II.  THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT 
A.  The Basic Setting of the IITR 
The IITR comprises two different types of income taxes: those 
imposed by the source jurisdiction (where income is formed through 
the productive activity of tangible and intangible assets, human 
capital, and capital investments) and those imposed by the residence 
jurisdiction (where the individual or corporate investor resides).2 
Formally, source jurisdictions have the right to first levy taxes on any 
type of income. However, in the case of income derived from financial 
assets, the taxing rights of source jurisdictions are often severely 
eroded in favor of those of residence jurisdictions.3 
There are two relevant types of source taxes on foreign corporate 
investments: the corporate income tax and withholding taxes.4 
Corporate tax is laid on the net taxable income of a corporate entity. 
If the corporation derives income from domestic and foreign sources, 
the corporate tax is applied as a source tax (on the income raised by 
domestic operations) and as a residency tax (on income generated 
abroad). In contrast, withholding taxes are laid on different types of 
payments (e.g., dividends, royalties, and interest) made by domestic 
taxpayers to foreign investors and trading partners; that is, 
 
 2  A residence country’s entitlement to tax the income of one of its residents is 
generally secondary to the source country’s right to tax that same income. If the 
residence jurisdiction levies a tax, it customarily offers some type of relief for taxes 
paid in the source jurisdiction. See Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic 
World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1760–81 (1995) (providing a 
good summary of the United States’s foreign tax-credit system); Stephen E. Shay et 
al., “What’s Source Got to Do with It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 
56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002). 
 3 See generally Roin, supra note 2, at 1760–62 (summarizing the main arguments 
in favor of source and residence taxation). 
 4 Although much of this article’s discussion is relevant outside the corporate 
framework, this article limits its analysis to corporations, since international 
commerce is overwhelmingly conducted by them. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax 
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 131 (2001). 
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withholding taxes are laid on sources of gross income and not upon 
net taxable income. Federal statutory law in the United States 
prescribes that every interest payment made to nonresidents that is 
not effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States 
is subject to a statutory withholding tax rate of 30% unless it qualifies 
for an exception.5 
 
 5 I.R.C. §§ 861(a), 862(a)(1), 871(a), 881(a)(1). 
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FIGURE 1.  A TAXONOMY OF THE IITR TAXES6 
 
B.  The Difficult Terrain of Taxing Financial Income 
The attempt by tax authorities to tax income derived from 
modern financial activities comprehensively and equitably is a 
Herculean task. The article refers to this income as “financial 
income.” (Part V.A., infra, presents a more detailed analysis about the 
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A corporation is a tax resident of country A. It has its headquarters located in country A and a foreign 
branch in country B. In a given year, the corporation earned $150 from its business activities in country A 
and $100 from its business activities in country B. (Both figures represent net taxable income before taxes.) 
In this example, country B is solely a source jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax as a source tax 
on the $100 earned by the corporation in it. Country A is both a source and a residence jurisdiction. 
Therefore, it lays its corporate tax on the entire $250 earned by the corporation in that year. Country A’s 
corporate tax is laid as a source tax on the $150 earned by the corporation in its jurisdiction and as a 
residence tax on the foreign sourced income earned by the corporation’s foreign branch in country B. To 
avoid double taxation, country A, the residence jurisdiction, will typically grant the corporation tax credits 
for the corporate income taxes it pays abroad in the source jurisdiction, country B. All corporate income 
taxes are laid on net taxable income (before taxes), so if the corporation were losing money, it would not be 
exposed to the taxes. Withholding taxes are laid by the source country on gross income payments. In the 
above example, assume that the corporation’s headquarters (located in country A) took out a loan from an 
unrelated lender in country C and the foreign branch (in country B) leased some intellectual property rights 
from it. In a given year, the corporation's headquarters and foreign branch had to pay $20 interest and $50 
royalty payments, respectively, to the unrelated party. In this case, countries A and B could lay withholding 
taxes on those payments. These taxes, which are nominally imposed on the unrelated party, are not income 
taxes, since they would have to be paid even if the party incurs losses in a given year and therefore has no 
economic income. 
 
 * Withholding taxes may also be laid on dividend payments as well as interest and royalty payments 
made from a foreign subsidiary to its parent. 
** The withholding taxes are levied on gross income payments, and thus are imposed even though the 
unrelated party in country C has a net income loss in the taxable year in which it is receiving the 
payments. 
Net income subject to corporate tax: 
Country A: 
$250 worldwide/residence 
income subject comprised 
of two components (each 
subject to corporate tax). 
 
$150 on domestically-
sourced income subject to 
corporate tax as a source 
tax. 
$100 foreign sourced 
income of the branch 
subject to A’s corporate 
tax as a residence tax. 
Country B: 
$100 source income 
subject to source 
corporate tax. 
Country C 
Payments to unrelated party in C** subject to 
source withholding taxes: 
Country A: 
$20 subject to A’s withholding 
taxes. 
Country B: 
$50 subject to B’s withholding 
taxes. 
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precise definition of this term). The accelerating velocity of changes in 
financial markets imposes a heavy burden on legislators and tax 
authorities trying to formulate effective rules and enforcement 
policies. These changes can be separated crudely into a number of 
interwoven layers. First, the post-industrial economy is becoming a 
more service-laden one in which the overall value and volume of 
informational assets is constantly increasing.7 The value of these assets 
(e.g., intangibles and financial assets), which do not have any tangible 
location, mainly comprises the human capital resources invested in 
their formation and deployment. The difficulty of valuing information 
assets and the growing mobility of these assets make it difficult for tax 
authorities to place and value significant sources of income.8 
Second, technological advancements, particularly in the fields of 
computers and telecommunication, have been constantly changing the 
platforms on which financial commercial activity takes place. This 
“change in platforms” bundles together a number of different aspects. 
Finance activities are taking place today in international markets (a 
trend that started most notably with the development of the 
Eurobond markets9), which are much more loosely regulated than 
traditional domestic ones. These markets offer their investors a wide 
range of volatile, readily tradable portfolio investment alternatives, 
which deviate considerably from traditional foreign direct investment 
practices.10 Modern markets operate in electronic venues and are 
monitored by investors and issuers that reside in developed countries. 
Communication technologies also allowed financial intermediaries to 
expand and to offer a wider range of end services in numerous 
jurisdictions.11 Computer technologies even created new types of 
 
 7 David R. Hardy, Assignment of Corporate Opportunities — The Migration of 
Intangibles, 100 TAX NOTES 527, 527 (July 28, 2003). 
 8 See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 317 (2001); 
Hardy, supra note 7. 
 9 James P. Holden, Jr., Note and Comment, Repeal of the Withholding Tax on 
Portfolio Debt Interest Paid to Foreigners: Tax and Fiscal Policies in the Context of 
Eurobond Financing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 375, 383 (1985) (describing the development 
and attributes of Eurobond markets and the manner by which they insure investors’ 
anonymity and withholding free returns). 
 10 For instance, an American issuer on the Eurobond market will typically avoid 
the regulatory constraints of making a public offering. The issuer will know very little 
about the identity of the bond purchasers. In the case of financial institutions 
operating from offshore financial centers, the Eurobond markets offer a platform in 
which they can operate with little or no reserve requirements. 
 11 See generally Peter Athanas, Permanent Establishments of Banks, Insurance 
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electronic currencies.12 In light of these technology-driven changes, 
financial transactions occur quickly and without leaving a paper trail. 
This renders tax (and regulatory) monitoring of financial activities 
difficult. 
Third, the use of innovative financial derivative instruments grew 
significantly in the last quarter of a century — a development, which 
was catalyzed by the increasing sophistication of international 
financial markets.13 These finance instruments are often engineered 
contractually to provide taxpayers with timing and character tax 
arbitrages. Timing arbitrage reflects a taxpayer’s ability to defer or 
accelerate income or deductions. Character tax arbitrage is a 
taxpayer’s ability to translate any type of highly-taxed investment into 
a different, yet economically near-equivalent investment instrument 
(or array of instruments), effectively subject to a lower tax rate.14 
Taxpayers are therefore able to manipulate the classification of a 
certain profit or loss on the instrument and its proceeds as either 
capital gains or ordinary income.15 
Fourth, another important shift is the migration of financial assets 
and activities to offshore financial tax havens.16 The unregulated and 
 
Companies and Other Financial Institutions, 81 CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL 
INTERNATIONAL 1, 71 (1996) [hereinafter IFA]. 
 12 Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of 
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1267–68 (2001). 
 13 Financial derivatives sometimes include indices that represent a composite 
price mechanism rather than a specific type of asset. Accordingly, derivatives allow 
cash commutation of the values of capital, commodities, and intangibles without an 
actual exchange taking place in the ownership of the underlying assets. See TIM 
EDGAR, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2000). 
 14 Character arbitrage into two different types: first, the ability to characterize 
net gains or losses as ordinary income, short capital gains, and long capital gains; and 
second, the ability to characterize financial instruments as equity or debt (in the latter 
case, making payments deductible). 
 15 See Jeffrey M. Colón, Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. 
International Tax Policy at the Crossroads, U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778 (1999); Edgar, 
supra note 13 (providing a comprehensive account of the law and economics of 
various financial instruments and explaining the role of hybrids and synthetic 
instruments as well as the difficulty of taxing them under existing cubbyhole tax 
conventions); Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects Double Taxation 
of Corporate Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 465 (2002) (demonstrating how financial 
innovations could be used to avoid corporate tax while providing quasi-equity 
interests to their holders); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and 
Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993). 
 16 Tanzi, supra note 12, at 1271–72, 1279. 
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untaxed offshore financial sector has developed gradually in the 
shadows of emerging global financial markets, with the implicit 
consent of developed countries.17 The lack of regulatory and tax costs 
in tax havens allows investors to pool and utilize their capital 
resources efficiently.18 Additionally, such tax havens offer taxpayers 
fertile grounds for tax planning, avoidance, and deferral 
opportunities.19 More importantly, they provide individuals and 
businesses with significant evasion opportunities.20 These evasion 
opportunities are a byproduct of low tax rates and bank and corporate 
secrecy laws in tax havens. The widespread use of the Internet plays 
an important role in the offshore industry. The Internet protects 
evading taxpayers’ anonymity,21 eases their communication with 
offshore promoters, and allows them to transfer funds and control 
investment vehicles (e.g., trusts, accounts, and corporations) in tax 
havens. Taxpayers often fail to report their income from investments 
in those jurisdictions, and tax authorities do not devote the necessary 
resources to obtain information about evaders or to prosecute them.22 
Consequently, offshore financial tax havens flourish by attracting 
capital flights from high-tax countries.23 This results in significant 
revenue losses, major inefficiencies of investment allocation, and a 
shield for illicit money laundering activities.24 
Fifth, there has been a salient shift in the business culture with 
 
 17 See generally SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 117 
(1992). 
 18 Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition, and Economic Performance, 43 
TAX NOTES INT’L 587, 592 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
 19 See generally id. at 590. 
 20 See Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of 
Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 681–86 (1982); 
Cono R. Namorato & Scott D. Michel, International Criminal Tax Cases, 50 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 617, 621 (1996) (explaining how phony deductible business expenses to 
foreign corporations could be used to transfer money to accounts at offshore financial 
centers); Thomas W. Ostrander, The Offshore Credit Card and Financial Arrangement 
Probe: Fraught with Danger for Taxpayers, 99 J. TAX’N 113, 113–15 (2003) (explaining 
how evaders cash out hidden offshore financial assets through electronic payment 
devices and exploring the Service’s attempts to trace such payments). 
 21 See Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How 
the Internet Is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 343–45 (2002). 
 22 See Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud: The Downfall of Murderers, 
Madams and Thieves, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 640 (1997). 
 23 See Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: 
Will It Last? Will It Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 40–41 (2003) (providing a 
brilliant taxonomy of tax havens). 
 24 Id. at 41–42, 44–45. 
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regard to tax planning. This trend began in the 1970s when United 
States corporations formed foreign subsidiaries to overcome tax and 
regulatory access barriers to the Eurobonds markets. This practice, 
along with early tax legislation of the Reagan Administration that 
encouraged tax planning, induced an ever-growing hunger in the 
corporate sector for tax arbitrage profits during the early 1980s.25 This 
desire for easy tax profitability escalated as the liberalization and 
competitiveness of the global economy increased. Recently, the tax 
planning industry developed a number of aggressive, yet effective, tax 
planning techniques that exploit the “check the box” regulations and 
the use of hybrid entities. These techniques allow MNEs to repatriate 
excessive foreign tax credits and avoid taxation of holding companies 
in low-tax jurisdictions under Subpart F.26 
Sixth, the arm’s-length standard is a transaction-based convention 
applied to source transactions between affiliated parties.27 Through a 
set of transfer-pricing rules, it inquires how hypothetical unrelated 
parties would price a certain transaction,28 requiring each corporate 
entity within an MNE group to report accordingly.29 In the related 
party finance realm, it is virtually impossible for tax authorities to 
unveil and systemize MNEs’ financial structures according to the 
arm’s-length standard. Pricing the “proper” interest rate of a specific 
related debt transaction is a feasible task for the tax authorities of 
developed countries. However, tax authorities have no conceptual 
benchmark for determining whether the debt form of the transaction 
 
 25 Michael J. Graetz, Your Tax Dollars at Work: Why U.S. Tax Law Needs to Be 
Changed, 48 EMORY L.J. 849, 857 (1999). 
 26 Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May 
Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 
SMU L. REV. 751, 759–63 (2006) (showing how MNEs use hybrid entities for 
importing tax credits); Yilmaz, supra note 18, at 590 (claiming that holding hybrid 
entities in tax havens are used by United States MNEs to reduce foreign subsidiaries 
tax liabilities while avoiding exposure to Subpart F liabilities). 
 27 See Roin, supra note 2, at 1787 (suggesting that the United States may be 
losing significant revenues because of related party transactions). 
 28 David H. Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, 
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 27 (2004) 
(arguing that hypothetical tests are needed in the income tax because contractual 
fictions allow for many situations in which transactions cannot be accepted at face 
value). 
 29 Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 45–47 (1993); Joann M. Weiner, 
U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Paper Considers States’ Experience Regarding 
Formula Apportionment, 1999 WTD 182-23 (Sept. 21, 1999). 
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is proper, given the numerous alternatives available to taxpayers for 
mobilizing and repackaging fungible capital assets. MNEs’ flexibility 
in arranging their capital structure allows them to locate their capital 
assets (and derivative income proceeds) in low-tax jurisdictions and 
their finance expenses in high-tax jurisdictions. The arm’s-length 
standard cannot source coherently affiliated financial transactions 
because there is no one “correct” and objective standard for allocating 
financial risks.30 Capital’s tax-sensitivity, mobility, and homogeneous 
nature31 make it possible and profitable for taxpayers to manipulate 
their earnings — a reality that tax authorities find difficult to confront 
given their limited audit and litigation resources.32 
Another source of difficulty is the gradual erosion of withholding 
taxes over the course of the last fifty years. There have been two main 
sources of this erosion. The first source is the gradual reciprocal 
reduction of withholding taxes through double taxation treaties 
(DTTs). Countries entering into DTTs tend to reduce their statutory 
withholding tax rates, because withholding tax rates on gross income 
are considered an impediment to foreign investments and trade 
relations. The impact of these DTTs is intensified through a practice 
known as treaty shopping. Treaty shopping occurs when 
(sophisticated) taxpayers channel financial flows through conduit 
entities in jurisdictions with favorable DTT-networks to avoid 
unfavorable withholding taxes levied upon payments to 
nonresidents.33 This way, taxpayers are able to extend withholding tax 
reductions, attained through such “DTT-havens,” to entities in 
jurisdictions with more conservative DTT policies. In response to 
these abuses of the DTT-network, it has become common practice for 
some nations, most notably the United States, to enter limitation of 
 
 30 Gary D. Sprague, Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and 
Permanent Establishments — Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects, 
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 988 (2002). 
 31 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of 
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 
TAX L. REV. 353, 393–95 (2001). 
 32 An illustration of this issue is the difficulty of allocating profits to foreign 
branches of banks. See IFA, supra note 11, at 72; Peter Randall, Attribution of Profits 
to Permanent Establishments of Financial Institutions, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 875 
(2002). 
 33 These practices are facilitated mainly through developed countries with 
extensive DTT-networks (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). MNEs and 
other international equity and debt investors may create conduit entities in such 
“DTT-havens” to transfer funds through them. See Charles I. Kingson, The 
Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1275 (1981). 
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benefits clauses34 into their DTTs and to enact anti-conduit statutory 
legislation.35 Doubt, however, has arisen over the effective 
enforcement of these arrangements.36 The second source of 
withholding tax erosion is source countries’ withholding tax 
exemptions on income derived from elastic and tax-sensitive capital 
investments (e.g., portfolio investments and bank accounts).37 Source 
countries typically grant these exemptions as broad unilateral 
measures. The high demand for foreign investments dictates that, 
lacking any cartelized multilateral coordination, these types of mobile 
investments are subject to extensive tax competition. International 
investors often use the high demand for their investments to shift 
withholding tax burdens to debtors in source countries — rendering it 
difficult politically to sustain these taxes. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above-mentioned 
attributes, along with the financial and monetary liberalization in the 
post-Cold War globalization era, have enhanced tax competition over 
now-elastic capital resources and financial activities. Subject to 
inferior information and to prisoner’s dilemma constraints,38 loosely-
 
 34 See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax Convention art. 22, Sept. 20, 1996; 
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 245–46 (2000); David R. Tillinghast, 
Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 465–66 (1996) (mentioning that having a 
limitation of benefits provision has become an inflexible demand of the United States 
in DTT negotiations). 
 35 I.R.C. § 7701(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1998) (combating back-to-back loans). 
 36 This doubt results from the high negotiation costs, complexity, and enormous 
information-finding and litigation costs that tax authorites are not able to cover. 
 37 Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 
TAX L. REV. 537, 547–54 (2003) (providing the key distinctions between direct and 
portfolio investments and arguing that the latter is more short term and volatile, thus 
responding with greater mobility to bottom-line changes in expected returns and to 
changes in the financial markets). 
 38 The following table shows the tax competition grid. Assume a world with only 
two countries, A and B, which share materially equivalent investment attributes for 
mobile capital assets. Each country wants to attract investments and levy income 
taxes on its proceeds. The prisoner’s dilemma table includes two parameters, amounts  
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coordinated governments are motivated to try to attract investments 
from international taxpayers (such as MNEs).39 MNEs’ ability to 
pressure governments for tax concessions makes it difficult to identify 
whether the source of the effective reduction in their tax liabilities is a 
result of aggressive planning or of deliberate governmental attempts 
to compete for their activities by reducing their effective tax rates.40 
MNEs’ perceived responsiveness to skew their financial activities 
according to tax incentives41 encourages governments, not 
 
 State B imposes high taxes 
on mobile capital assets 
State B does not  
impose taxes on mobile  
capital assets 
State A imposes high 
taxes on mobile capital 
assets 
A = In(50%), Rev(high) 
B = In(50%), Rev(high) 
A = In(0%), Rev(0) 
B = In(100%), Rev(0) 
State A does not impose 
taxes on mobile capital 
assets 
A = In(100%), Rev(0) 
B = In(0%), Rev(0) 
A = In(50%), Rev(0) 
B = In(50%), Rev(0) 
 
39Michael S. Lebovitz & Theodore P. Seto, The Fundamental Problem of International 
Taxation, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 535 (2001). This taxpayers’ group 
comprises mainly commercial parties that operate in several jurisdictions and also, to 
a lesser extent, affluent individuals with liquid or mobile assets. Such actors are able 
to utilize the loss of regulatory control on domestic capital resources to induce 
sovereigns to compete for foreign investment by eroding traditionally “fixed 
(political) costs” of conducting business. Understood in the context of global 
regulation, competition through tax policy — once considered a symbol of national 
sovereignty — may be perceived not as an exception, but rather as an indication of 
the peak of the regulatory competition trend. See J. Hackett, Overview and Summary 
of Discussions on the Policy Implications of Recent Tax Reforms on Investment Flows 
Between Member and Non-Member Countries, in TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL FLOWS 72, 73 (1990); Malcolm Gammie, International Tax Avoidance: A UK 
Perspective, 28 INTERTAX 267, 274 (2000). 
 40 Harry Grubert, Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by 
Government, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 113, 115 
(James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001). 
 41 Rosanne Altshuler et al., Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive 
to Tax Rates?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 9 
(James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001) (suggesting that there was a growing Foreign Direct 
Investment sensitivity to effective corporate tax rates during the 1984–1992 period); 
James R. Hines, Jr., Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND 
MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 1, 7 (James R. Hines, Jr. ed., 2001). Cf. Jack M. Mintz, 
Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates? Comment, in 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 32 (James R. Hines Jr. 
ed., 2001) (suggesting that the optimal evaluation standard of the analysis presented 
in the previous study should have been the effective tax rate on marginal investment 
rather than the average effective tax rate). 
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traditionally perceived as tax havens, to take tax competition 
considerations into account when formulating their tax systems. 
C.  Four Key Problems in Taxing Financial Income 
The accelerating mobility of assets during the last fifty years is an 
inevitable byproduct of a number of overall positive developments. 
These developments include the aforementioned telecommunication 
and computation advancements, overall pro-capitalist political 
stability, and the expansion of international financial markets. They 
allow taxpayers to place financial assets in one jurisdiction while 
controlling them from another. These developments, however, 
negatively impact tax authorities’ ability to levy taxes on financial 
assets. This article identifies four main problems derived directly from 
the mobility of financial assets in the global economy.42 
First, MNEs defer taxation on financial assets held by subsidiaries 
in low-tax jurisdictions. By avoiding repatriation of subsidiaries’ 
earnings, and by using hybrid entities to avoid Subpart F anti-deferral 
legislation, MNEs are able to transfer liquid financial assets of their 
foreign subsidiaries through low-tax havens. 
Second, MNEs use sophisticated networks of hybrid entities and 
financial flows to repatriate excessive tax credits.43 Under section 902, 
the foreign tax credit attached to subsidiaries’ dividends is determined 
as their total uncredited post-1986 tax liability multiplied by the 
amount of dividends and divided by their total post-1986 earnings and 
profits (E&P). This reveals a simple, yet interesting mathematical 
relationship: when a subsidiary’s E&P decreases, the proportion of 
foreign taxes (and foreign tax credits) attached to its dividends 
increases. Therefore, to generate excessive foreign credit capacity, 
MNEs try to have as much of their income as possible classified as 
foreign sourced by manipulating the source rules.44 This change of 
 
 42 There are other major tax avoidance avenues — such as inversion transactions 
intended to avoid residency taxation and the creation of artificial losses — that this 
article does not address. While these techniques definitely involve the deployment of 
financial assets, the core abuse is not associated with the mobility of financial assets, 
but with the uneconomic substance of the corporate residency concept (which allows 
corporations to escape residency taxation easily) and the incongruence between 
financial and tax accounting, which enhance the profitability of tax losses. 
 43 See Paul W. Osterhuis, The Evolution of International Tax Policy — What 
Would Larry Say?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (explaining how MNEs used 
hybrids to avoid Subpart F anti-deferral rules). 
 44 For example, taxpayers can use section 863(b)(2) to assure that a higher 
percentage of the income they derive from their exports is foreign sourced. By 
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classification in and of itself does not reduce MNEs’ tax liabilities 
because MNEs are subject to tax on their worldwide income. 
However, it creates an income source that “could be credited” with 
foreign tax credits.45 This type of planning requires MNEs to take 
advantage of numerous incongruencies between United States and 
foreign tax accounting rules to develop techniques for reducing their 
subsidiaries’ E&P. To achieve this E&P reduction, MNEs utilize 
affiliated financial transactions extensively. This allows them to create 
“pockets” of subsidiaries with low and high E&Ps. Finally, MNEs 
repatriate dividends selectively — only from those subsidiaries that, as 
a result of planning, have low E&P and paid a lot of foreign taxes in 
the past. When dividends are paid from these subsidiaries, a small 
amount of dividends “carry” with them substantial tax credits. With 
these (artificial) credits, MNEs reduce taxes on income from foreign 
sources (e.g., royalties and sales) of corporate entities that are United 
States tax residents. To the extent that MNEs exercise all three 
planning components effectively, they can credit much of their tax 
liability. Financial transactions are not the only way MNEs generate 
excessive tax credits. MNEs can use an array of tax planning tools to 
manipulate their foreign subsidiaries’ E&P and tax pools to generate 
higher foreign tax credits capacity. However, financial assets’’ 
mobility and fungibility make related financial transactions the 
cheapest, most readily available, and most effective planning tool for 
this type of credit-generating technique. 
Third, MNEs utilize capital fungibility to structure related 
financial transactions with favorable tax results. By controlling their 
internal financial structures, MNEs shift income to jurisdictions where 
they face low effective tax rates and deductions to jurisdictions where 
they face high effective tax rates. This problem is connected with 
MNEs’ ability to avoid withholding taxes on these related financial 
transactions. 
Finally, taxpayers evade tax by investing financial holdings in 
offshore centers without reporting earnings on these holdings to their 
residence jurisdictions. This problem connects directly to taxpayers’ 
ability to avoid withholding source taxes on their portfolio 
investments and foreign bank account holdings. The following table 
 
formulating a related partnership that buys the exports (from the MNE) and sells 
them as inventory to consumers abroad, an MNE can improve on the 50/50 rule 
prescribed under the regulations of section 865. 
 45 Once the relative amount of foreign-sourced income increases, there is also an 
increase in the foreign tax credit limitation determined by section 904 — so that 
MNEs can claim a larger amount of foreign tax credits overall. 
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provides a taxonomy of the aforementioned issues according to 
factors that will be significant in the article’s subsequent analysis. 
TABLE 1.  TAXONOMY OF THE FOUR MAJOR PROBLEMS  











Deferral No Residency Yes 
Credit 
repatriation 
No Residency Yes 
Related 
transactions 
No Sourcing Yes 
Unreported 
income 
Yes Residency No 
* This category deals with per se criminality. Nevertheless, some of the categories 
mentioned as not triggering criminal liabilities may be executed in an aggressive way 
recognized as a criminal violation of the tax law. 
Of the four aforementioned problems, that of unreported income 
is somewhat confined by a number of factors. First, although MNEs 
may engage in tax evasion, the problem of evasion is not categorically 
related to MNEs. Second, the remedy — extensive multilateral 
information sharing — has been known from the very beginning of the 
IITR. This is not to suggest that implementing a multilateral 
information sharing policy is easy. It does suggest, however, that the 
major advancement on this issue is most likely to be made on political 
and technological levels rather than on an analytical level.46 While this 
article refrains from addressing the tax evasion issue directly, it is 
 
 46 See generally Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other 
Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 
598 (2004) (mentioning that tax havens with bank secrecy laws play an important role 
in concealing illegitimate transactions); G. Scott Dowling, Fatal Broadside: The 
Demise of Caribbean Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 
TRANSNAT’L LAW 259, 285–93 (2004) (explaining how fear of being associated with 
terrorism motivates tax-havens to erode their bank secrecy laws); Suzanne Walsh, 
Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows: The Promises and Failures of the European 
Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005) (arguing that there is a 
convergence of interests — ranging from money laundering and anti-terrorism to tax 
evasion — that motivates Western countries to obtain information about offshore 
financial centers); Bruce Zagaris, Increasing Cooperation of International Tax 
Enforcement and Anti-Money-Laundering Enforcement, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 649, 659 
(Nov. 17, 2003) (describing how major information sharing provisions were enacted as 
part of the PATRIOT Act). 
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important to connect its information sharing remedy with the 
remedies to the other three problems. As in the case of tax evasion, 
any attempt to counter the other three problems of taxing financial 
income would have to establish, as a prerequisite, a framework of 
cooperation between sovereigns. This cooperation should facilitate 
transparency with regard to financial holdings of the vast majority of 
international investors. Hence, while the problem of tax evasion could 
be separated analytically, from a practical perspective its solution 
intertwines with measures that the article offers to redress other issues 
identified in this section. 
In the next part, the article analyzes important developments 
related to the problem of income shifting. In subsequent parts, the 
article offers its alternative proposal for dealing with the problem of 
income shifting. The article’s analysis also discusses how its proposal 
redresses the other two problems this part identifies: deferral and 
excessive credit repatriation. 
III.  PICKING UP THE GAUNTLET? THE RUDIMENTS OF AN 
ALLOCATION PHASE REGARDING FINANCIAL INCOME 
A.  Stages in the Development of Interest Taxation 
This part addresses the descriptive claim of the article that there is 
a growing readiness among different policymakers to consider 
methods that depart from current IITR conventions for sourcing 
MNEs’ interest and financial income. The article refers to this 
readiness as the possible emergence of an Allocation Phase. It is an 
expansion of the historical argument made in a previous article, which 
claims that the source tax base of capital income has been eroded 
because of considerations that focused too strongly on the importance 
of trade enhancement.47 It further claims that after the Cold War, tax 
authorities developed a new anti-avoidance paradigm that tried to 
combat source tax erosion by distinguishing between legitimate and 
abusive tax planning. This paradigm has been unsuccessful in 
reversing or slowing down source erosion tendencies for two reasons. 
First, tax authorities lack a conceptual base through which they could 
determine coherently what the fair source-base allocation for inbound 
investments should be. Second, the methodologies developed by tax 
authorities to filter abusive transactions are ineffective because they 
are based on the arm’s-length standard. The transactional emphasis of 
this standard necessitates a lot of ad hoc, fact-laden, case-specific 
 
 47 Benshalom, supra note 1. 
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inquiries with grave administrative (and compliance) costs. 
This part traces a new tendency in the IITR’s policy-making 
regarding the taxation of financial income. It surveys briefly the 
reformulation of the rules intended to combat thin-capitalization of 
MNEs’ subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions. It labels this potentially 
new policy trend as the Allocation Phase, hoping that it represents the 
beginning of an emerging new sourcing paradigm in the IITR. The 
features of this phase reflect IITR policymakers’ recognition that the 
main challenge and duty of the IITR is not to eliminate abusive 
transactions but to develop economically sound, administrable, and 
fair sourcing allocation methods of financial income. This part focuses 
on income shifting, which is considered a key issue because of the 
broad scope of abuse and the enormous compliance and 
administrative burdens it imposes. 
B.  Earnings-Stripping/Thin-Capitalization Case Study:  
Some Winds of Change 
The issue of thin-capitalization (or earnings-stripping, as it is 
called in the United States) was addressed by the previously 
mentioned research as a case study for the inadequacies of the anti-
avoidance paradigm.48 It is, therefore, worthwhile to review briefly the 
distinctive features of the thin-capitalization problem as well as tax 
authorities’ attempts to address it. 
Relatively low (source) withholding taxes laid upon proceeds of 
debt transactions make the economics of those debt transactions 
lucrative every time there is a jurisdictional mismatch, in which the 
lender is a tax resident of a jurisdiction with lower tax rates than the 
debtor. This is a combination of two factors. First, the debtor is able to 
deduct the interest it pays from its otherwise highly-taxed income. 
Second, the lender is subject only to low (or nonexistent) withholding 
taxes (on the gross interest payments) on the source level and low 
income taxes (on its net taxable income) in its country of residence. 
From taxpayers’ perspectives, this finance structure offers a lower 
(tax) cost for capital and is therefore superior to an equivalent 
domestic debt transaction (in which the lender is exposed to high 
income taxes) and to domestic and foreign equity investments.49 
This reveals the prima facie appeal of related debt financing due 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 In the case of equity investments, shareholder-investors bear at least some of 
the corporate tax burden and are exposed to higher income and/or withholding tax 
rates. 
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Country A: 0% ETR on  
corporate income 
Country B: 50% ETR  






$ 0 net taxable







$(-0) taxes paid  






• The three conditions of a 
jurisdictional mismatch: 




o Low or negligible 
withholding tax 
rates 
o Payments that, 
like interest, are 
tax-deductible 
• Affiliation between 
creditor and debtor 
Country A and Country B impose, respectively, a 0% and a 50% effective tax rate (ETR) on all 
sources of corporate income. A and B enter a double taxation treaty, which eliminates 
withholding taxes on interest payments. X and Y are two subsidiaries of a single MNE that are 
located in A and B respectively. In a given year, Y earns $100 from its business activities in 
country B, which would be subject to a 50% tax rate leading to a tax liability of $50. The MNE 
has a clear incentive to reduce its overall tax expenses. This can easily be done by financing Y’s 
activities by X’s debt instruments. For instance, subsidiary X loans subsidiary Y $1000, carrying 
the appropriate market rate of 10% annual interest. Y deducts the $100 interest payments from its 
income and X, which is tax-indifferent because of A’s low ETR, reports them as income. This 
way, Y’s income for that year is $0, and the MNE avoids $50 of source tax costs that would have 
been laid on Y by B. 
to potential jurisdictional mismatches between the locations where 
interest deductions and proceeds are recognized. By leveraging 
operations in high-tax jurisdictions and borrowing from low-taxed 
lenders, taxpayers may take advantage of interest expense 
deductibility and negligible withholding taxes on interest to reduce 
finance costs. This possibility is especially lucrative for MNEs, which 
can engage in related debt transactions to finance subsidiaries in high-
tax jurisdictions while retaining corporate control. This loophole 
stands at the center of this subpart’s analysis. 
FIGURE 2.  THE THIN-CAPITALIZATION TECHNIQUE50 
Tax authorities have developed methods limiting different 
variations of this source tax avoidance scheme. These regimes 
typically involve some hypothetical inquiries as to whether unrelated 
parties would have entered into these types of financial transactions. 
In cases where it is determined that unrelated parties would not have 
entered into these transactions, the deduction of the interest payments 
is disallowed.51 While the actual regimes differ substantially,52 they all 
 
 50 This figure was used in Benshalom, supra note 1, at 678. 
 51 Sometimes these interest payments are re-characterized as returns on equity 
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suffer from the same fundamental problem. The arm’s-length 
standard scalpels used by these regimes limit their ability to analyze 
the problem of thin-capitalization. As an analytical tool, the arm’s-
length standard is a useful pricing technique that compares related 
transactions to similar unrelated ones. It fails to provide a benchmark 
for what the correct legal form of a related financial transaction 
should be because there is no one “correct” form. Furthermore, as a 
normative matter, the arm’s-length standard does not explain why 
related creditors should be subject to the same favorable tax 
consequences granted to unrelated creditors, when the former are not 
truly subject to the high risks, especially credit risks, faced by the 
latter.53 
The prevalent feeling that there are overwhelming cases of tax 
abuse involving international transactions, along with the slim chance 
that the anti-avoidance paradigm will ever overcome its throes, have 
led some tax authorities to experiment with innovative anti-thin-
capitalization regimes. Sailing to terra incognita, some of these 
experiments have abandoned traditional IITR arm’s-length 
conventions. To avert the anti-avoidance pitfalls, these experiments 
sought to anchor their decisive factors on the cruder attributes of 
MNEs’ financial structure. 
A number of tax authorities have been willing to re-encapsulate 
their anti-thin-capitalization regimes while disregarding the 
fundamental cornerstones of the anti-avoidance approach, which 
distinguishes both between related and unrelated debt and between 
foreign and domestic debt. This section explores these 
experimentations briefly. The next section discusses whether they 
mark a new phase in the IITR’s treatment of financial income. 
1.  The Attempt to Change the United States’ Earnings-Stripping 
Regime 
The discussion of the United States earnings-stripping regime 
surfaced in light of the relatively high number of tax-motivated 
corporate inversion transactions executed in 2002.54 These 
 
and thus subjected to corporate tax and, possibly, to different withholding tax rates. 
 52 Some rely on methods that emphasize the need for case-by-case inquiries; 
others rely on the corporate debt-equity ratios as benchmarks; yet others scrutinize 
shareholder debt-equity ratios. See Benshalom, supra note 1, at 683–85. 
 53 Id. (developing this point in much more detail). 
 54 See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: 
Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions (Univ. of Mich. Ross 
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transactions involved a replacement of an American parent 
corporation with a foreign surrogate that was a resident of a tax 
haven. The ability of the foreign surrogate to engage in earnings-
stripping by injecting related party debt into the former United States 
parent and its subsidiaries was perceived as one of corporations’ long 
term tax savings from the inversion.55 This provoked bipartisan 
political attempts to amend the United States earnings-stripping 
regime.56 These attempts were eventually abandoned after 
encountering harsh opposition from taxpayers’ lobbies.57 
Of the various attempts to reform the United States earnings-
stripping regime, the article focuses only upon one specific aspect of 
the Bush Administration’s proposal. The Administration’s proposal 
would have complemented the United States earnings-stripping 
regime with an innovative interest-disallowance rule, which was 
unrelated to the arm’s-length inquiry. This disallowance rule would 
have been triggered every time a United States subsidiary was found 
to be “disproportionately leveraged” in comparison with the entire 
MNE group. Once triggered, the rule would have disallowed the 
deduction of certain interest payments that the United States 
 
Sch. of Bus. Office of Tax Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. 2002-04, June 
2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/expatriationsubmission.pdf; Hal 
Hicks III, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical, Contemporary, and 
Transactional Perspectives, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 899 (June 2, 2003) (analyzing the 
main features of the 2002 inversion waves and stressing that, unlike inversions in 
earlier years, recent inversions are characterized by the willingness of shareholders to 
realize capital gain taxes to attain long term benefits of avoiding United States 
residency taxation); Carol P. Tello, Inversion Transactions: New Style Transactions 
Raise New Policy Issues, 43 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 211 (2002) (providing a 
thorough description of inversion transactions and some of the means by which 
policy-makers sought to counter them). 
 55 Hicks, supra note 54, at 907, 915–16; Developments in the Law — Jobs and 
Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2278 (2005). 
 56 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2896, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2003”, at 76–78 
(Joint Comm. Print Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-72-03.pdf; 
Diana L. Wollman, Recent U.S. Earning Stripping Proposals: Why Were the Doctors 
Called and Is the Medicine Worse than the Disease?, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 483, 494–96 
(May 5, 2003) (describing the original “Thomas proposal,” which included a 
disproportionate indebtedness test based on the worldwide leverage test). 
 57 See Mikael Norman & Mark Russell, Company Criticizes Earnings Stripping 
Provisions, 2003 TNT 99-28 (Mar. 18, 2003); Organization for International 
Investment, OFII White Paper on Related-Party Interest Payments, 2003 TNT 154-53 
(Apr. 7, 2003). 
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subsidiary made to related parties.58 The notion behind this measure 
was that MNEs abuse the tax system even when they finance United 
States activities with unrelated debt while financing other operations 
in low-tax jurisdictions with equity investments. The underlying idea 
seemed to be that MNEs use the deductibility of interest payments to 
unfairly avoid the relatively high United States corporate tax rates on 
their source income. 
Unrelated parties that enter a debt transaction do not compare a 
subsidiary’s level of leverage with that of the entire MNE group. 
Hence, the Administration’s proposal anchored the abusiveness of its 
disallowance rule to the notion of MNE managements’ control over 
their entire pools of financial assets. This rule encapsulates the idea 
that it is unfair for MNEs to disproportionately debt finance their 
United States operations and deduct interest to reduce their United 
States source income tax liabilities. 
This article deviates from the general line of criticism against the 
Administration’s proposal.59 It argues that the Administration’s 
proposal was too limited because, even though it adopted a 
disproportional leverage test, it resulted only in disallowing the 
deduction of interest payments made to related parties. This 
combination is inconsistent. The disproportional leverage test added 
by the Administration’s proposal was innovative and challenging 
precisely because it had nothing to do with related party transactions. 
Therefore, it should not have been limited to disallowing only the 
deduction of interest payments to related parties. Derivatively, the 
new disallowance rule would have entailed enormous compliance, 
Administration, and short term transition costs in return for a 
relatively modest yield of expected revenues. The lesson is that, since 
 
 58 The disallowed interest was intended to be only the proportional amount of 
related debt that would have been extracted from the disproportional leverage. 
 59 As many of its critics noted, the proposal involved a massive increase in tax 
compliance costs. Additionally, some of its critics suggested that its deviation from the 
arm’s-length standard discriminated against foreign MNEs. This concern was partly 
justified because the new disallowance rule took into account only gross interest 
payments of the United States subsidiaries when determining their disallowance. This 
may have led to severe disallowance of interest expenses even in fiscal years when 
taxpayers had a positive net interest income (this concern was valid mainly with 
regard to the financial sector). These commentators further claimed that this type of 
discrimination overrides United States anti-discrimination obligation under various 
DTTs. See Harry L. Gutman et al., KPMG Urges Reconsideration of Proposals 
Regarding Earnings-Stripping Provision, 2003 TNT 83-13 (May 1, 2003); Lawrence R. 
Uhlick, Banking Group Discusses Earnings Stripping Proposal, 2003 TNT 59-33 (Feb. 
14, 2003). 
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the reformulations of IITR conventions are costly, tax reformers 
should aspire to turn the tide rather than to do things in halves. 
2.  Australia and New Zealand’s Anti-Thin-Capitalization Legislation 
New Zealand enacted its unique anti-thin-capitalization 
legislation in 1996. In doing so, it was aware of the multiple forms in 
which earnings-stripping may take place, as well as the difficulty of 
separating transactions motivated by tax avoidance from “legitimate” 
commercial ones. Accordingly, while restricted to deal with 
subsidiaries of foreign investors, it was not restricted to examine 
related debt exclusively.60 Rather, under the New Zealand thin-
capitalization rules, the interest deduction disallowance is triggered 
when a subsidiary debt-asset ratio exceeds 3:4 and its indebtedness is 
greater than 110% of the MNE’s overall indebtedness.61 The 
overwhelming majority of companies avoid the compliance hurdles of 
the thin-capitalization regime by meeting the debt-asset ratio.62 
In 2001, as part of a general revision of its income taxation of 
business enterprises, Australia reformulated its anti-thin-
capitalization legislation along the general lines of the New Zealand 
thin-capitalization rules.63 Interestingly, the Australian Treasury 
 
 60 Andrew M. C. Smith, New Zealand’s Thin Capitalization Rules, 44 CAN. TAX 
J. 1525, 1525 (1996). 
 61 Grant Richardson et al., Thin Capitalization Rules: An Anglo-American 
Comparison, 24 INT’L TAX J. 36, 48 (1998). Taxpayers are granted great flexibility in 
choosing the manner by which this comparative indebtedness is calculated. Smith, 
supra note 60, at 1540. 
 62 Richardson, supra note 61, at 50 (arguing that more than anything, New 
Zealand’s thin-capitalization regime was intended to convey a clear message to MNEs 
not to exceed the debt-asset ratio); Andrew M. C. Smith & Paul V. Dunmore, New 
Zealand’s Thin Capitalization Rules and the Arm’s-Length Principle, 57 BULL. INT’L 
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 503, 510 (2003) (mentioning that, even before the thin-
capitalization legislation was enacted, most nonresident companies would not have 
fallen within its ambit); Smith, supra note 60, at 1547. 
 63 The Australian legislation had a few exceptions. First, it provided a more 
lenient ratio for financial institutions. Second, it covered parent corporations of 
Australian MNEs, which were exempt under the former anti-thin-capitalization 
legislation. REVIEW OF BUSINESS TAXATION, A TAX SYSTEM REDISIGNED 664 (1999), 
available at http://www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/download/Section22_ 
P.pdf (mentioning that the reason to include parent corporations of Australian MNEs 
was motivated by the belief that those corporations could allocate disproportionably 
excessive debt to their Australian operations). Finally, it provided relief to taxpayers 
who could prove that their financial transactions would have been undertaken by 
unrelated parties operating at arm’s-length. See generally Michael Wachtel, 
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justified the reform by claiming that former thin-capitalization rules, 
which scrutinized related foreign debt through arm’s-length lenses, 
were unable to deal with problems associated with the major issue of 
disproportionate leverage.64 
3.  The European Experience with Member States’ Anti-Thin-
Capitalization Legislation 
In the EU context, the attempt to limit the deduction of interest 
payments to related parties presents an oddity. It runs against the 
Commission’s directives that limit source taxation by prohibiting 
withholding taxes on related dividend, interest, and royalty payments 
between related parties that are residents of Member States.65 
Member States’ anti-thin-capitalization regimes clash with the EU’s 
broader objective to reduce tax costs on financial flows in the internal 
market. Thus, thin-capitalization rules aim to prevent the deduction of 
the same interest payments that were exempt from withholding taxes 
by the directives. 
The most important development on this issue is the verdict 
issued by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Lankhorst-Hohorst 
GmbH.66 The ECJ found that the German anti-thin-capitalization 
legislation infringed upon the Rome Treaty’s Freedom of 
Establishment Clause and found no persuasive argument why, in the 
case of thin-capitalization, Germany should be exempted from the 
clause’s general application.67 In its decision, the ECJ seemed to have 
 
Australia’s New Thin Capitalization Regime, 55 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 
380, 381, 387 (2003). 
 64 See generally REVIEW OF BUSINESS TAXATION, supra note 63, at 659 
(“Australia’s current thin capitalization provisions are not fully effective at preventing 
an excessive allocation of debt to the Australian operations of multinationals because 
they refer only to foreign related party debt and foreign debt covered by a formal 
guarantee rather than total debt.”). 
 65 Council Directive 90/435/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 225) (EC); Council Directive 
2003/49/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 157) (EU). The objective of thin-capitalization legislation — 
to differentiate between domestic and foreign investment — may also seem 
inconsistent with the EU’s kingpins of (free-trade related) free flow of capital and 
freedom-of-establishment rights. See generally Markus Ernst, Toward a Level Playing 
Field for Thin Capitalization: German and U.S. Approaches, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 657, 
659, 661 (Aug. 21, 2006) (discussing the European Court of Justice’s Lankhorst-
Hohorst GmbH decision). 
 66 Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 
E.C.R. I-11779. 
 67 Alex Cordewener, Company Taxation, Cross-Border Financing and Thin 
Capitalization in the EU Internal Market: Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst 
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conveyed a clear message to the EU’s national legislators that thin-
capitalization cannot automatically be equated with tax avoidance.68 
To comply with the ECJ’s ruling, Germany has extended the 
application of its thin-capitalization rules to all corporate entities and 
to their debts — including to creditors that are tax residents of 
Germany (where there is no concern of jurisdictional mismatch 
problems).69 Recently, United Kingdom tax authorities proposed 
changing their thin-capitalization rules along these lines.70 
C.  The OECD and the Allocation of Profits for Branches  
of Financial Institutions 
Thin-capitalization is not the only example that suggests that 
policymakers around the world recognize that the arm’s-length 
standard is impractical in sourcing financial activities and preventing 
income shifting. As elaborated upon in Part V.A, this difficulty 
materializes at its extreme with respect to FMNEs (MNEs that are 
financial intermediaries). Since FMNEs engage primarily in financial 
transactions, tax authorities cannot break down their activities using 
arm’s-length methodologies. Consequently, the OECD recognized 
that the issue of allocating income from FMNE-affiliated transactions 
 
GmbH, 43 EUR. TAX’N 102, 111–12 (2003); Lars-Erik Wenehed, Thin Capitalization 
and EC Law, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 1145, 1146 (June 16, 2003) (noting that “[a]ccording 
to the ECJ, the German thin-capitalization legislation does not have a specific 
purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, designed to circumvent German 
tax legislation, from attracting a tax benefit, but applies generally to any situation in 
which the parent company is resident outside Germany.”). 
 68 Adam Craig et al., ECJ Renders Wide-Reaching Decision on German Thin 
Capitalization Rules, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 2002 WTD 240-2 (Dec. 13, 2002). This 
broad interpretation of the Freedom-of-Establishment Clause places former German 
anti-thin-capitalization legislation and similar Member State legislation in question. 
Id.; see Oliver Roumelian, The End of French Thin Capitalization Rules?, 31 
INTERTAX 244, 246–47 (2003). For a more general discussion of the impact of the 
ECJ’s anti-discrimination tax jurisprudence, see Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren 
Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 
115 YALE L.J. 1186 (2006). 
 69 Ernst, supra note 65, at 661; see Rolf Schonbrodt & Uwe Woywode, 
Treatment of Secured Unrelated-Party Loans Under German Thin Capitalization 
Rules, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 145 (Apr. 11, 2005) (describing how the thin-capitalization 
legislation, specifically Section 8aKStG, was expanded to both resident and 
nonresident shareholders, related parties, third party lenders, and debtor companies 
as of 2004). 
 70 HM TREASURY, TAXATION OF COMPANIES’ FOREIGN PROFITS: DISCUSSION 
DOCUMENT 19 (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.go.uk/media/E/9/ 
consult_foreign_profits020707.pdf. 
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could not be left in its currently incoherent and arbitrary state. 
In 1998, the OECD issued a report addressing the sourcing of 
FMNEs engaged in global trading of securities and financial 
instruments.71 In that report, the OECD recognizes the difficulty of 
applying traditional arm’s-length methods that depend on the 
existence of market comparables to affiliated transactions within 
functionally integrated FMNEs.72 In particular, the 1998 OECD 
Report identifies the problems associated with sourcing the residual 
income from FMNEs, which is the income generated from the cost 
savings associated with the integrated structure of FMNEs. 
Additionally, it recognizes the difficulty of pricing accurately and 
coherently the growing volume of FMNE-affiliated transactions.73 
Despite these observations, the 1998 OECD Report clings to the 
traditional transactional transfer-pricing methods and restrains tax 
authorities’ ability to use profit-allocation methods.74 Much in line 
with the ideas expressed in the 1998 OECD Report, the United States 
Treasury issued the proposed dealing regulations concerned with 
taxing FMNEs engaged in securities dealing.75 
 
 71 The OECD Report begins by defining entities engaged in “global trading” as 
those who have “the capacity . . . to execute customers’ orders in financial products 
[and sometimes to manage their own proprietary portfolios] in markets around the 
world and/or around the clock.” ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT [OECD], THE TAXATION OF GLOBAL TRADING OF FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS 12 (Mar. 4, 1998). The OECD Report further elaborates on three 
different models by which FMNEs may conduct their trading operations: (1) 
integrated trading, in which an FMNE has a single trading book passed between 
different locations; (2) centralized product management, in which an FMNE assigns 
all market risks for a particular line of products to a specific location while allowing 
the marketing of that asset to take place also in other locations; and (3) separate 
enterprise trading, in which each branch and entity within an FMNE has its own 
trading and proprietary books. Id. at 19–20. 
 72 Id. at 29–30. 
 73 Id. at 42. 
 74 The OECD report stresses that the profit-split method, the only method that 
allocates income by net profits and is not based on market comparables, is to be used 
only as an option of last resort. Id. at 53–56. It distinguishes between two types of 
profit-splits: net profit-split and residual profit-split. Id. at 43 (providing that, while 
under the net profit-split the entire profit will be allocated by the profit-split formula, 
the residual profit-split method will first reward less integrated functions according to 
transactional transfer-pricing methodologies). 
 75 The Proposed Dealing Regulations (Proposed Regulations) set out to resolve 
a number of features (e.g., the broad definition of effectively connected income and 
the nonrecognition of transactions with foreign branches), but most of them were not 
directly related to the dilemma of whether an arm’s-length standard is a suitable 
mechanism for sourcing these transactions. The Proposed Regulations apply four 
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The 1998 OECD Report was followed by a series of reports that 
dealt with the attribution of profits to branches. Unlike other types of 
MNEs, FMNEs operate through branches rather than subsidiaries for 
better compliance with financial regulations.76 Accordingly, in 2006, 
the OECD issued another report (the Report), which contained a 
general part and two parts that address banking and financial 
instrument trading.77 The final version of the fourth (and last) part of 
the Report, dealing with the insurance sector, is scheduled to be 
published soon. 
No new canon emerged from the Report. Its working hypothesis 
is that branches should be treated as if they were functionally separate 
entities. This, by and large, aligns with traditional arm’s-length 
inquiries as to how to isolate branches as if they were entities and how 
to price branch dealings, both with the parent company and with other 
branches. Derivatively, it engages in a lot of arm’s-length inquiries as 
 
transfer-pricing methodologies and adhere to the best-method rule. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.482-8(a)(1), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). The first three methods are not 
fundamentally different from traditional arm’s-length transfer-pricing methods. See 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(b)–(d), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). The fourth 
method is an elaborated profit-split allocation methodology, which contains examples 
specifically tailored to various dealing operations. It prescribes that the net income of 
the activity should be attributed to each jurisdiction according to the contribution of 
each branch/entity. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). 
The term “contribution” is not defined in the Proposed Regulations and is therefore 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e)(3), 63 Fed 
Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). It also suggests a residual profit-split method, which 
requires that routine contributions be compensated under ordinary transactional 
transfer-pricing methods prior to the formulary allocation of net profits among 
participants. Unlike other expenses, interest expenses are sourced through an asset-
based formula to be attributed against foreign income, as prescribed by Code 
section 864(e) and the relevant regulations. 
 76 Most MNEs do not operate through branches (unless they have losses) 
because operating through subsidiaries provides them with limited liability, tax 
deferral, and foreign credit planning opportunities. On the other hand, FMNEs tend 
to operate through branches because of the capital adequacy requirements of 
financial regulation (CARs). These regulations require that a financial institution 
have a minimal amount of equity capital to support its operation in order to reduce 
financial institutions’ incentives to over-leverage their operations. The CARs reduce 
financial instability and the chances of systemic collapse. To arrange their assets 
flexibly, an FMNE typically operates as one legal entity so that its equity supports its 
worldwide operations. 
 77 OECD, REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENTS PARTS I (GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS), II (BANKS) AND III 
(GLOBAL TRADING) (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/14/ 
37861293.pdf. 
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to how to determine the branch’s risk exposure, creditworthiness, and 
freestanding capital. 
However, while adhering to “old” arm’s-length rhetoric, the 
OECD inserted two somewhat subversive notions in the Report, 
which erode the arm’s-length paradigm. First, the Report states that 
tax authorities should allocate functions to FMNE branches according 
to the “significant people” operating in each branch.78 Second, the 
Report ties the first step and the attribution of income generating 
assets to the branches. The combination of these two steps highlights 
the importance of allocating functions to a branch according to its 
“significant people” in determining the income allocated to it. It 
further mentions that this asset allocation would reflect the relative 
share of each branch in overall FMNE income.79 From this emerges an 
innovative idea that deviates from the arm’s-length standard. It 
suggests that income should be allocated according to the functions 
that people in different branches perform, and not according to risk 
shifting contractual settings that unrelated parties may have endorsed. 
However, after introducing this idea, the Report retreats. It states that 
once functions and assets have been identified, the internal dealings 
among the branches should be sourced according to old transfer-
pricing methods — cumbersome and futile as they have proven to be. 
To date, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Report on future 
sourcing of FMNEs. The Report leaves taxpayers and sovereigns 
much flexibility and discretion in implementing the rules. Hence, it is 
difficult to know which idea will leave its mark: the old rhetoric or the 
new allocation-by-significant-people method. Nevertheless, the 
Report shows that the OECD clings to its “better the devil we know” 
transfer-pricing policy by rejecting any serious evaluation of 
comprehensive unitary or formulary solutions. It is doubtful that 
OECD officials believed it feasible to break down the enormous 
volumes of affiliated transactions within FMNEs on a transactional 
basis.80 This adherence to the status quo could be explained by the 
OECD’s tendency to exercise political caution as a response to the 
strong opposition of the financial sector to any mandatory unitary (or 
profit-splitting) allocation mechanisms.81 Nevertheless, even though 
 
 78 Id. at 14–15. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Lee A. Sheppard, Gremlins in the Global U.S. Dealing Regulations, 25 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 431, 434 (Feb. 4, 2002). 
 81 American Bankers Association, American Bankers Association Comments on 
Discussion Draft on the Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments, 14 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 2011 (June 16, 1997) (stressing the importance of respecting the form of 
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the OECD initiatives avoid any serious consideration of the arm’s-
length standard, they also promote the notion that allocation of 
financial income requires a broad-reaching and practical solution in 
the near future. Even though not explicitly stated, it is also evident 
that this solution is not to be found in traditional arm’s-length 
standard inquiries. 
D.  Allocation Phase: Some Final Remarks 
The Allocation Phase is in the initial stages of taking form. 
Nevertheless, the development in thin-capitalization and branch 
allocation rules reviewed by this part reflects the recognition that the 
problem of sourcing financial income may not be solved on the 
quicksand of the ad hoc arm’s-length standard approach. 
Furthermore, the thin-capitalization example suggests that the 
different sourcing problems associated with MNEs’ financial 
structures (e.g., affiliated lending and disproportional leverage) 
cannot be insulated from one another. 
While the problems of the arm’s-length approach are not confined 
to the taxation of financial income, this article explores whether the 
allocation of financial income within related settings could be 
addressed separately. Policymakers’ growing recognition that MNEs’ 
manipulation of financial assets is a major source of abuse motivates 
the article’s agenda. Its analysis offers a comprehensive multi-layered 
reform of this specific issue and hopes to contribute to a reform 
process that may occur in the foreseeable future. 
IV.  FRAMING THE PROBLEM: WHY ARE FINANCIAL  
TRANSACTIONS SPECIAL? 
A.  The Unique Characteristics of Mobility and Fungibility 
Financial transactions are unique in practice but not in theory. In 
theory, almost every type of tax reduction plan that uses affiliated 
financial transactions could be executed via other types of affiliated 
transactions. For example, MNEs can strip income through leasing 
transactions; they can shift income by inflating prices and risks 
associated with non-financial affiliated transactions. 
In practice, however, a few unique features make the sourcing of 
 
the transactions themselves, and objecting to the emphasis of the OECD Paper on the 
factor of human capital, which, as discussed later, is a classical unitary factor for the 
purpose of profit-split allocation). 
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financial transactions the spinal column of many tax planning 
transactions: their mobility, their fungibility, and the tax-sensitivity of 
financial markets. 
With the exception of intangibles, a topic this author addressed in 
a different paper,82 financial assets are the most mobile assets. They 
are costless to deploy and store and therefore could be utilized from 
almost any jurisdiction with stable political, monetary, and financial 
regulatory regimes. Furthermore, financial assets are used by every 
type of business and are executed through sophisticated and tax-
efficient financial markets.83 Professionals operating in financial 
markets have developed tax planning cultures, where they market 
their expertise to create products that attain tax planning objectives as 
an inherent part of their services. 
As described in Part II.B, the fungibility of financial assets 
nullifies tax authorities’ attempt to determine the appropriate price 
for financial transactions. Taxpayers can hybridize, bifurcate, and 
synthesize similar financial flows in numerous ways to attain the most 
tax-efficient results. The business integration of many MNEs hedges 
contractual risk shifting by affiliated financial transactions. Unlike 
unrelated parties, between which the consequences of risk shifting 
through financial engineering may be vital,84 and therefore costly, 
MNEs may inflate the price of certain transactions, knowing that the 
risk borne by them would not change as a whole. With few 
exceptions,85 MNEs bear no substantial economic costs of structuring 
their internal financial flows one way or the other. Tax authorities do 
not have the resources to audit the increasing volumes of affiliated 
financial transactions because the arm’s-length standard requires them 
to find the proper market comparables of specifically tailored 
financial flows. 
 
 82 Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations 
and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631 
(2007). 
 83 In this environment, professionals specialize in designing the most tax-
favorable instruments for different taxpayers — often through the use of financial 
intermediaries and taxpayers with low (or no) tax-sensitivity (e.g., tax-exempt foreign 
residents or Marked-to-Market taxpayers). 
 84 For example, when parties construct equity derivatives, those derivatives 
typically face different credit risks and different rights in insolvency, and do not entail 
shareholder voting power. These different features affect the risk and price that 
parties undertake when buying these derivatives as opposed to equity derivatives. 
 85 For example, consider cases of insolvency and cases where the subsidiaries 
have to comply with debt-equity regulations (such as the CAR regulations in the 
financial sector). 
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To summarize this point, for MNEs, affiliated financial 
instruments are the ultimate tax planning device. They could be used 
by entities at any place operating in any line of business. The 
engineering possibilities are endless, their economic and audit risks 
exposure is negligible, and the tax planning expertise for these 
transactions is readily available. As a result, MNEs can manipulate 
the sourcing of income derived from affiliated financial transactions 
and use them, almost freely, for stripping and deferring income as well 
as for generating foreign tax credits. What could possibly be better? 
B.  Framing the Solution 
The solution advocated by this article challenges the traditional 
convention, which regards the two methods by which MNEs’ affiliated 
transactions are sourced: the arm’s-length standard and the 
unitary/formulary methods, as almost mutually exclusive.86 The article 
argues that tax authorities should source MNEs using both arm’s-
length and formulary methods. Arm’s-length methods adequately 
source most MNE non-financial affiliated transactions, which have 
market comparables; therefore, tax authorities have a legitimate 
interest in continuing to use them for these types of transactions. 
However, because of their unique features, affiliated financial 
transactions should instead be sourced through unitary or formulary 
sourcing conventions. 
Under unitary methods, an MNE’s total taxable income is 
aggregated and then sourced by an allocation formula among the 
jurisdictions in which it operates. Formulary methods allocate income 
in a similar way, although they do not aggregate MNEs’ entire 
income, but only income derived from specific sources. While the 
mechanics of the unitary and formulary arrangements are described in 
the following parts, the evaluation of the article’s analysis requires 
elucidating the normative framework of the unitary/formulary 
alternative beforehand. The article justifies the shift from arm’s-length 
to formulary methods due to the following four reasons. 
First, the unitary sourcing method taxes income on a territorial 
rather than on a worldwide basis. After the entire income of an MNE 
is aggregated, it is allocated to the different jurisdictions where it is 
 
 86 The binary distinction between these two alternatives favors the status quo, in 
which the arm’s-length standard is used. While there is consensus about the 
deficiencies of the arm’s-length standard, the impracticality of a multilateral or 
unilateral implementation of a unitary system garners even more consensus. 
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taxed once.87 Any shift to a formulary sourcing arrangement 
strengthens the concept of source over residency taxation. This shift 
toward a more territorial system merits discussion. As the author has 
written elsewhere, 88 scholars and politicians still debate whether 
income tax should be imposed on a worldwide or territorial basis. 
However, from a realist political perspective, it seems as though the 
issue has already been resolved in the United States in favor of 
territorialism. The recent IITR tax reform proposal of the Bush 
Administration emphasized the shift to a simpler territorial dividend 
exemption tax regime to increase revenues and competitiveness for 
United States businesses. This aligns well with other recent years’ 
Code amendments that erode residency taxation.89 Although there 
have also been some recent proposals to reduce deferral and expand 
worldwide taxation,90 these proposals suffer from low political viability 
because they go against sovereigns’ growing tendency to erode 
residency taxation. Thus, even if the United States had the political 
will, it might not succeed in changing the international current. Unless 
the United States can swim against this current by itself, it seems 
likely that the present United States IITR will be replaced with a 
much more territorial tax regime. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee 
that such a reform will take place in the near future. This article does 
not directly address whether there is a normative justification for 
taxing foreign sourced income through a residual residence tax. 
However, the low political viability of the residual worldwide tax, 
along with its extremely low revenue yields, lead the article to 
conclude that it is worthwhile to start thinking about how a viable 
territorial sourcing regime should operate. The article’s formulary 
methods offer a viable and more territorial alternative to the current 
tax regime that resonates well with contemporary political currents. 
 
 87 Even though all unitary systems operating today are territorial, a unitary 
method does not have to be purely territorial. Theoretically, the allocation formula 
can also account for factors that indicate corporate residency such as the location of 
headquarters or place of incorporation. 
 88 Benshalom, supra note 82, at 633–34. 
 89 Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax 
on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 492 (1999) (claiming that, since 1996, 
the subpart F anti-deferral regime provides taxpayers with an ever-expanding deferral 
privilege); see I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(6), 965; see also I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (eliminating, as of 
2007, the eight-basket system in favor of a two-basket system that allows much more 
cross-crediting, which will reduce the actual taxes levied from residents’ foreign 
income). 
 90 Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Ingenious Kerry Tax Plan, 103 TAX NOTES 477 (Apr. 
26, 2004) (describing the Kerry plan to curb deferral). 
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Second, the current IITR treatment of affiliated financial 
transactions is broken beyond repair. In fact, the arm’s-length 
standard is so inept at dealing with these transactions that tax 
authorities already employ quasi-unitary alternatives. One alternative 
used frequently is the profit-split transfer-pricing method. Tax 
authorities use this method to bifurcate the income of functionally 
integrated MNEs. It requires the different MNE entities to split the 
total income derived from an activity according to each party’s 
contribution. It aggregates the income derived from the activity and 
then divides this aggregated figure among the relevant parties. This is 
very different from the traditional arm’s-length inquiry, which 
hypothesizes how unrelated parties would price the transaction. 
Compliance with this nontransparent case-by-case formulary 
allocation mechanism is costly for both taxpayers and tax authorities 
because it is amorphous as a matter of policy design. It depends on 
documentation and fact-finding requirements. It is also biased in favor 
of taxpayers, given tax authorities’ inferior information and lack of 
audit and litigation resources. Furthermore, the particularity of the 
profit-split analysis, as well as taxpayers’ ability to partially control 
whether and how to apply it, render it difficult to generate any general 
principles out of it. As mentioned earlier, the OECD also deviates 
from the arm’s-length standard in its discussion of the branch 
allocation rules.91 
Tax authorities have de facto abandoned traditional arm’s-length 
standard methods with regard to the hard-to-source income 
generating activities of MNEs.92 Hence, they have a lot to gain and 
little to lose by making this explicit and shifting to formulary 
allocation. A unitary proposal would use general, transparent, hard-
to-manipulate and easy-to-observe indicators to determine the 
relative volume of an MNE’s activities in each jurisdiction in which it 
operates. It would reduce taxpayers’ ability to shift income as well as 
the compliance costs of transfer-pricing. To be sure, unitary 
arrangements are not free from compliance costs, tax reduction 
possibilities, or investment distortions. However, compared to the 
current transfer-pricing regime, the formulary arrangements proposed 
by this article provide equitable and coherent sourcing arrangements 
with low compliance costs. 
Third, the unitary system incentivizes MNEs to utilize their 
 
 91 See OECD, supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 92 For example, the proposed dealing regulations emphasize the use of the 
profit-split method. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e), 63 Fed. Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). 
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resources flexibly and in a centralized and efficient manner. 
Formulary allocation methods allocate MNEs’ income by relying on 
hard-to-manipulate indicators tied to specific geographic locations. If 
MNEs cannot escape the taxes on their financial activities by 
sheltering them in low-tax jurisdictions or by avoiding repatriating 
funds, they are free to utilize their assets efficiently without taking tax 
considerations into account. Thus, once fiscal ownership is fixed, 
MNEs would be able to utilize their financial assets in a centralized 
(tax-indifferent) manner. A difficult-to-manipulate and easy-to-
comply-with unitary regime would thus reduce both compliance costs 
and post-investment tax distortions. This article does not participate 
in what is essentially a political debate over the proper effective tax 
rate that should be imposed on income derived from financial 
activities and financial assets. It does, however, suggest that the 
proper way sovereigns should determine MNEs’ effective tax burden 
is by instituting tax-rate adjustments and not by creating blemish 
source rules that erode the MNE tax base. 
Fourth, unitary systems disregard affiliated transactions. In the 
context of affiliated financial transactions, this feature of the unitary 
formula means that financial transactions could not be used in MNEs’ 
tax planning schemes. As established in the previous section, this will 
not prevent MNEs from engaging in intra-group tax planning, but it 
will deprive them of the most useful tool for doing so. The shift to a 
unitary system has important positive externalities beyond the 
prevention of income shifting. This shift would make many of the 
current schemes, which rely on affiliated financial transactions, less 
available, less effective, and more costly so that they are not as 
lucrative for MNEs to pursue. 
This article’s argument that tax authorities should source 
affiliated financial transactions through formulary rather than arm’s-
length methods depends primarily on one key issue: the nature of the 
allocation formula. This formula should strike a careful balance 
between concerns about audit accuracy, anti-abuse, and tax 
administration. There is an inevitable tension between concerns of tax 
administration, which require simplicity of rules, and concerns of audit 
accuracy, which require adjustability and particularity. Anti-abuse 
concerns sometimes require broad and simplified rules to prevent an 
array of potential abuses. On other occasions, they require 
adjustability so as to counter innovative tax planning schemes. The 
following parts’ analysis explores this tension in great detail. When 
exploring the outstanding issues through which this balance comes to 
the fore, this article adheres to the following framework. First, it 
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identifies the most accurate way to conduct the audit. Second, it 
makes a number of assumptions as to how the specific aspects of the 
formula should be modified to be reasonably administrated. Third, it 
tries to examine the impact of simplification through anti-avoidance 
lenses and makes the proper adjustments. Finally, it examines whether 
the overall solution it recommends produces intuitively correct 
allocation results. 
C.  The Unitary Alternative to the Arm’s-Length Standard 
The unitary system comprises two separate steps. The first is an 
income calculation step. In the unitary system, income is calculated 
jointly for an entire MNE and not separately for each of its branches 
and entities. To calculate their income, MNEs’ tax filings include a 
consolidated report of their entire earnings rather than separate 
reports for each of their entities. This consolidated reporting 
effectively disregards affiliated transactions. After MNEs’ income is 
calculated comes the second income allocation step. Here, MNEs’ 
income is distributed among the different jurisdictions in which they 
operate according to an appropriation formula. This formula adopts 
what may seem to be easy-to-observe and difficult-to-manipulate 
factors (e.g., the amount of sales, payroll, and assets) as indicators of 
the relative share of MNEs’ economic activity taking place in each 
jurisdiction.93 Unitary systems do not prescribe identical tax rates 
among different jurisdictions.94 
The underlying core idea of the unitary system is that there is no 
one magic metric that penetrates the opaque process through which 
MNEs generate their profitability. This opaqueness prescribes that 
factors of the appropriation formula represent policy choices about 
how to allocate tax rather than precise economic indicators of how 
MNEs generate income. Unlike the arm’s-length standard, which tries 
to source according to market benchmarks (of what unrelated parties 
would do), the unitary sourcing regime aspires to tax MNEs’ income 
only in near approximation. Tax authorities’ formulary 
determinations of the proportional contribution of different factors to 
 
 93 Christina M. Lyons, The Constitutionality of the Worldwide Combined 
Reporting Method of Taxation of Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. 
Franchise Tax Board, 37 B.C. L. REV. 183, 187–88 (1995). 
 94 See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in 
International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1344–46 (2001) (arguing for an 
agreed-upon rate range to reduce incentives for source tax competition between 
jurisdictions). 
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MNEs’ profitability are by definition arbitrary. Furthermore, unitary 
system sourcing is a crude averaging mechanism, disregarding the 
different risk propensities and other distinctive circumstances of 
various MNE investments.95 For example, under a unitary system it is 
impossible for a profitable MNE to recognize loss in a specific 
jurisdiction no matter how bad its performance is in that jurisdiction. 
The most conceptually intriguing issue in the policy design of a 
unitary system is the composition of the formula. To avoid the 
daunting problems of the arm’s-length standard, the formulary factors 
should be connected to immobile indicators of economic activity. As 
previously mentioned, these factors may only serve as proxies for the 
economic activity being taxed.96 Further, as with any tax assessment 
criteria, the identification of formulary factors provides taxpayers with 
the incentives to manipulate the indicators to minimize tax liability.97 
In the case of financial income, it is difficult to identify easy-to-
observe and difficult-to-manipulate formulary indicators that 
correlate with the conduct of economic activity. Indeed, the system 
employed by the United States — a federal nation — to allocate 
corporate income to different state governments refrains from 
including financial income as part of the unitary tax base.98 This article 
argues that this approach is wrong. Its main thesis is that the unitary 
system would be most effective if employed to source hard-to-locate 
financial activities. 
Policymakers and academics often suggest formulary factors that 
fail to meet the above-mentioned goals with regard to financial 
income. For instance, FMNEs can easily manipulate one of the most 
frequently mentioned formulary factors: sales.99 Because financial 
 
 95 Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and 
Transfer-Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 655–56 (2002). 
 96 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1349 (1996) (arguing that from a 
tax perspective the jurisdiction of incorporation is a meaningless distinction). 
 97 See Jack M. Mintz, Globalizing the Corporate Income Tax: The Use of 
Allocation, 56 FINANZARCHIV 388, 414–18 (1999). 
 98 UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 7 (1956); Walter 
Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., The European Commission’s Report on 
Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US 
States, 11 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 199, 202 (2004). 
 99 Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate 
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment 14, 20 
(The Brookings Inst., The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2007-08, 2007); see 
Charles E. McLure, Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s Length 
Standard with Formulary Apportionment, 56 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 
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assets are mobile, sale transactions may be executed legally from any 
of the locations in which a given FMNE is operating. A formulary 
allocation method relying on sales would provide taxpayers with 
incentives to finalize deals in tax havens. Tax authorities would find it 
practically impossible to track where the economic sale of each 
transaction occurred. This analysis has one important exception: retail 
(lending and financial) services to individuals. It is relatively easy to 
observe the location of retail transactions because the vast majority of 
individuals borrow, lend, and consume financial services where they 
live. This is very different from corporations, which can create 
subsidiaries anywhere without incurring substantial costs.100 
Derivatively, when FMNEs contract with individuals, it is easy to 
determine the geographic location of the sale. Audit accuracy, with 
regard to income generated through FMNE retail activities, requires 
that sales be part of the allocation formula. This way the formula 
would reflect the geographic allocation of MNEs’ consumer-based 
intangibles in different jurisdictions.101 The problem with this 
approach is that it requires taxpayers and tax authorities to bifurcate 
FMNEs’ total income into the portion generated from individuals and 
the portion generated from businesses. This would obviously create 
potential compliance hurdles and, more importantly, allow FMNEs to 
shift income between these two types of activities. Therefore, the 
desirability of having two formulas — one to allocate income that 
FMNEs derive from businesses and one to deal with income that they 
derive from individuals (which would include sales) — is questionable. 
Because tax authorities can not isolate these two sources of income 
without generating too many compliance costs and abuse possibilities. 
This article takes the view that this separation is too costly to 
maintain. Furthermore, in the case of FMNEs, the article argues that 
adding a sales factor is unnecessary because the factors on which it 
choses to focus — tangible property and payroll — reflect, to a certain 
degree, FMNE retail activities. Simply put, while some financial 
services could be executed from foreign countries, if FMNEs wish to 
reach individual clients in high-tax jurisdictions, they still have to 
 
586, 593 (2002). 
 100 See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 1, at 694 n.214 (reviewing the way 
corporations created subsidiaries in the Netherlands Antilles to issue bonds to the 
Eurobond markets while enjoying a low withholding tax rate that was reduced by the 
double taxation treaty). 
 101 For example, FMNEs invest a lot to create consumer-based intangibles such 
as goodwill. The best indicator of where this goodwill is located is the amount of sales 
in each jurisdiction. 
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invest in tangible property and experienced workforces in that 
jurisdiction to run the operation. This may change over time as 
internet banking becomes more popular. To the extent that this shift 
takes place, it may be necessary to account for retail activity in a 
different way. 
Property and, moreover, financial assets are also considered 
frequently as possible formulary benchmarks.102 When adopted as a 
sourcing formulary factor, property should be attributed to the 
location where it is employed rather than where it is owned, because 
legal ownership is contractually mobile.103 Determining the geographic 
location where assets are economically employed is extremely difficult 
for intangibles and even more so for financial assets. It is doubtful 
whether the ownership and risk-bearing propensities of these assets 
could in fact be sourced analytically to a specific branch or entity 
within an integrated MNE. Accordingly, while tangible property may 
be attributed to various geographic locations, a different indicator 
would have to be used to source the income derived out of an MNE’s 
main pool of assets, which comprises capital and intangible assets. 
The last indicator typically considered a formulary factor is 
payroll. This factor assumes a correlation between income generated 
and payroll costs incurred in a specific location. This article stresses 
the importance of payroll as a key indicator of its appropriation 
formulas. Like retail sales, the payroll factor is the aggregation of 
relatively easy-to-observe contracts between MNEs and individuals. 
However, unlike sales, payroll cannot be manipulated through 
nonretail transactions because it could only be paid to individuals (this 
article addresses the issue of outsourcing in detail later). In the 
absence of a sales factor, payroll emerges as an important indicator as 
to where MNE intangibles are geographically allocated. Goodwill, 
successful retail activity, and production-based intangibles developed 
by MNEs (e.g., risk management computer software) all require 
human capital that to a great degree is reflected in the payroll factor. 
To be sure, the payroll factor is not a perfect match to the sales factor 
in determining the value of consumer-based intangibles. However, 
MNEs’ ability to manipulate sales makes payroll the most attractive 
alternative. 
Ideally, the definition of the payroll factor should be broad in two 
 
 102 McLure, supra note 99, at 593; OECD, supra note 77 at 15–16 (tying much of 
its analysis to the attribution of capital financial assets and risks). 
 103 See Charles E. McLure, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European 
Union: The Commission’s Proposals, 36 TAX NOTES INT’L 775, 786 (Aug. 31, 2004). 
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important respects. First, it should encompass the compensation paid 
by MNEs for a broad range of services provided by their employees, 
as well as independent contractors. Second, the calculation of payroll 
should include all types of costs associated with labor, including costs 
of benefits and social security contributions. This broadness 
guarantees that the payroll factor reflects the actual level of economic 
activity taking place in specific jurisdictions. If tax authorities treat 
independent contractors and employees differently, MNEs would 
manipulate these categories. For example, if compensation for 
independent contractors is not included in the unitary calculations, 
MNEs will reduce their tax liabilities in high-tax countries by 
outsourcing many services they purchase. The same is true if tax 
authorities treat various types of compensation differently. If, for 
instance, compensation in the form of stock options is excluded from 
the formula, MNEs will start granting more of it to their employees in 
high-tax jurisdictions. However, as this article demonstrates below, 
administrative and anti-abuse concerns may require limiting the 
payroll factor. For instance, the difficulty of determining 
compensation for services rendered by independent contractors may 
dictate that the payroll factor be limited to employees or even to 
specific types of employees. 
V.  THE ALLOCATION PHASE IN AN (ALMOST) “IDEAL” REALITY: 
FMNES’ INCOME 
A.  The Financial Sectors and Financial MNEs — 
 A Story of Integration 
Financial intermediaries provide a number of vital functions in 
the modern economy.104 In recent years, as a result of the 
liberalization of monetary and financial regulatory regimes around the 
world, financial markets witnessed an onslaught of cross -border and 
cross-sector integration.105 Financial firms developed new instruments 
and services and began to operate in new geographic locations to meet 
 
 104 These functions include funding, saving facilities, financial services (transfers 
of funds), trading services, insurance underwriting, and hedging contracts. 
 105 See CHARLES GOODHART, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE 
NOW? (1998) (discussing some of the financial regulatory implications of such 
integration trends).’’ Traditionally, the financial sector has comprised three legally 
distinct sub-sectors: banking, securities trading, and insurance. See JONATHAN R. 
MACEY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 511 (3d ed. 2001). Most banks and their 
foreign branches do not limit their activities to any specific type of financial activity. 
IFA, supra note 11, at 83. 
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the changing demands of their clients.106 The integration of financial 
markets served as a platform for the rise of new competitive business 
structures of FMNEs, which are essentially MNEs that carry out most 
of their business activities within the financial markets. FMNEs utilize 
their multi-sector and multi-jurisdictional spectrum to better employ 
an economy of both scope and scale.107 
In their operation, FMNEs manifest many of the global market’s 
advantages. However, as the recent financial crises suggest, they also 
exemplify sovereigns’ difficulties in imposing effective economic and 
fiscal regulation.108 FMNEs are uniquely positioned to avoid income 
taxes by shifting their income to low-tax jurisdictions.109 Tax 
authorities experience difficulties in penetrating FMNEs’ business 
structures, because of their extensive interrelatedness and because 
they involve deployments of services and capital assets rather than of 
tangible goods.110 Each of the branches and entities of such financial 
Goliaths may, under different capacities, offer all of the FMNEs’ end 
services out of its general pool of human and capital assets.111 This 
 
 106 John Neighbour, The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments, 16 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1269, 1269 (Apr. 20, 1998). 
 107 In what is an informational market, FMNEs are able to create specialized and 
centralized services, to develop finer human capital expertise and reduce operational 
costs; to obtain, analyze, and use information more efficiently; and most importantly, 
to endure a higher risk exposure because of their portfolio and activity diversification 
and reliance on less risky affiliate transactions. American Bankers Association, supra 
note 81; Charles T. Plambeck, Transfer Pricing Analysis of Global Trading Operations 
and Procedural Alternatives, 74 TAXES 1129, 1132, 1135 (1996); Charles T. Plambeck, 
The Taxation Implications of Global Trading, 44 BULL. INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 527, 529 (1990) (mentioning competitive advantages of conducting 
a global-centralized dealing operation). 
 108 The international network of FMNEs is thus a source of concern with regard 
to many issues (e.g., financial stability of global markets and criminal-fund money 
laundering). 
 109 See IFA, supra note 11, at 81 (mentioning that some of the OECD guidelines 
on banks include factors such as the location of where the terms were negotiated, 
where the decision of granting the loan was made, where the contract was agreed 
upon, and where the loan is administered); Ben Seesse, The Bermuda Reinsurance 
“Loophole”: A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the Globalizing 
Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 541 (2001) (demonstrating the unique 
position of FMNEs that allows them to pursue tax avoidance plans). 
 110 MATTIAS LEVIN & PEER RITTER, TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, in TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 197, 228 (Patrick Honohan, ed. 2003); 
IFA, supra note 11, at 71–72, 87. 
 111 OECD, supra note 77, at 28 (stressing that this is indeed the case with global 
trading of financial instruments). 
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process is very difficult to reconcile with transfer-pricing’s traditional 
paradigm, which assumes a distinctive structural production chain in 
which activities with an identified home location add value to the 
product.112 This gap between the “traditional” paradigm and how 
FMNEs actually operate puts tax authorities at a disadvantage.113 The 
revenue implications of these concerns may be horrendous, given the 
ever-growing volume of mobile sophisticated capital assets that 
FMNEs channel in their activities.114 The profound functional 
integration of FMNEs fuses the risks and interests of their branches 
and entities.115 Hence, the main difficulty tax authorities face is how to 
price and restructure uniquely tailored related transactions within 
FMNEs, and whether to respect the face value of those transactions’ 
contractual risk allocations.116 
B.  Delineating the Scope of the Article’s Proposal in an “Ideal” Reality 
Financial institutions offer an “ideal” setting for experimenting 
with innovative tax allocation techniques for financial income because 
their business activities involve primarily two types of assets: human 
capital and financial assets.117 FMNEs utilize almost all of their human 
capital assets to service financial assets. Hence, basically all of 
FMNEs’ income could be categorized as financial income. FMNEs are 
therefore the plain vanilla case for the study’s inquiry of seeking a 
 
 112 Andrew M. Snyder, Taxation of Global Trading Operations: Use of Advance 
Pricing Agreements and Profit-Split Methodology, 48 TAX LAW 1057, 1059 (1995). 
 113 See Susan C. Borkowski, Global Trading of Financial Instruments and 
Transfer Pricing: A Brief History and Exploratory Study, 29 INT’L TAX J. 22, 36 (2003) 
(showing that, due to the difficulty of auditing financial institutions there is an “audit 
gap” with regard to the ability of tax authorities to effectively monitor their 
operations). 
 114 This concern may be amplified given that FMNEs are typically among the 
most affluent and well-advised taxpayers. 
 115 Randall, supra note 32, at 885 (suggesting that this makes the risk component 
difficult to assign to any specific location). 
 116 IFA, supra note 11, at 87; Sheppard, supra note 80, at 434 (pointing out that 
unrelated party finance involves more risk — especially credit risk — than related 
transactions, and that this divergence of risks affects the price of transactions, making 
it difficult to compare them to unrelated transactions). 
 117 These assets are packaged in many different legal forms. Human capital may 
be provided as services, production intangibles (e.g., risk assessment software), or 
marketing consumer-based intangibles (e.g., goodwill). Financial assets may have 
different physical forms (e.g., cash, notes, e-money) or legal definitions (e.g., stock, 
bonds, swaps, futures, or options — all of them could be replicated by other 
instruments). See supra note 15. 
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better alternative for sourcing MNEs’ financial income. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, the transactional fact-based 
arm’s-length paradigm simply falls apart in the case of integrated 
FMNEs. This article’s proposal (the Proposal) does not aim to provide 
a flawless sourcing regime. Taking existing alternatives as its reference 
point, it aims to provide a more equitable, transparent, administrable, 
and coherent sourcing solution for FMNEs than the one currently in 
place. Boldly put, given the difficulties of existing alternatives, it is 
easy for the Proposal to offer improvements. 
The analysis in this part assumes the following. First, it is possible 
to insulate and distinguish FMNEs from other MNEs. Second, 
FMNEs operate exclusively through branches and fully owned 
subsidiaries. Third, the article assumes the existence of a 
comprehensive multilateral agreement that implements the Proposal.   
This “ideal” reality allows the article to crystallize the Proposal’s 
principal analytical foundations. However, it is important to stress that 
this “ideal” reality is not a utopian coast beyond reach in the case of 
FMNEs. In most Western countries, FMNEs are indeed insulated. 
They are prevented from operating in other market sectors by the 
national financial regulatory regimes.118 Firms operating in the 
financial sector are subject to distinct ownership rules that prevent 
them from being substantially engaged in businesses of other sectors. 
This outcome of prudential financial regulation suggests that although 
there are always hard cases on the margins, the vast majority of 
FMNEs could be easily distinguished from other MNEs. 
To operate flexibly while complying with financial regulations, 
which deal with capital adequacy requirements, FMNEs (especially 
banks) operate mainly through branches.119 To protect sensitive 
information and valuable intangibles, many FMNEs own all or almost 
all of their subsidiaries’ stock. 
Some type of multilateral agreement in the case of FMNEs is also 
not impossible. Although a unanimous approval by all countries of a 
comprehensive income allocation rule does indeed seem unlikely, it is 
not necessary in the case of FMNEs. To cover most of FMNEs’ 
activities, only a critical mass of countries where FMNEs operate need 
to approve the Proposal. Most FMNEs’ activities take place in 
jurisdictions that have large-scale financial markets operating within 
 
 118 IFA, supra note 11, at 77, 99. 
 119 Branches may go into partnerships with other financial institutions. 
Determining the income allocation of partners is a separate (and extremely 
complicated) task, which this article does not address. 
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them and, therefore, it is only necessary to reach an agreement among 
those jurisdictions. What comprises this critical mass may vary 
according to the economic activity performed by the FMNEs. For 
example, establishing a viable sourcing arrangement in the case of 
securities dealing probably requires only an agreement among United 
States, United Kingdom, and Japanese tax authorities. In the case of 
banking, the addition of Germany and France and other Western 
European countries may also be required. Given the relatively small 
number of countries involved, and their similarity of interests,120 
attaining this objective is admittedly difficult but not impossible. 
C.  The Proposal 
In light of the above analysis, it appears that the best factors in an 
apportionment formula sourcing FMNEs’ earnings would be the 
indicators of tangible property and payroll. The common virtue of 
both indicators is their relative immobility and ease of assessment. 
The task of the unitary formula is, therefore, to provide a good proxy 
for locating the income FMNEs generate. Since FMNEs derive most 
of their income from intangible and financial assets, the benchmark 
through which this income should be sourced is payroll.121 The main 
underlying normative theme behind this argument is that mobile 
financial assets are economically owned jointly by all of FMNEs 
subsidiaries and branches. Since FMNEs’ financial assets cannot 
themselves be geographically located, tax authorities can only allocate 
FMNE income by tracing the geographic location of the human 
capital that elicited it. Additionally, while the Proposal relates only to 
the sourcing of net taxable income, it could easily be extended to 
include the sourcing of net taxable capital gains and losses arising 
from the sale of capital assets. 
The Proposal involves the following steps. First, one has to 
determine FMNEs’ net taxable income. Due to different tax bases and 
tax accounting rules, tax authorities’ ability to reach one agreed-upon 
figure of net taxable income is doubtful. This, however, is not a 
problem in the “ideal” reality addressed by this part, which assumes a 
comprehensive multilateral agreement. It is nevertheless important to 
 
 120 All are developed countries and depend, at least to some degree, on corporate 
income taxes to sustain long term welfare obligations. Part V.B will address this issue 
in greater detail. 
 121 In this respect, the Proposal aligns with the insight of the 2006 OECD report 
that the main value of FMNEs is generated through their experienced workforce. See 
OECD, supra note 79. 
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note that this net taxable income figure should include only the profits 
and losses from business activities (including deductions for employee 
compensation). As discussed below, it should not include tax 
expenditures. Furthermore, depreciation expenses of tangible 
property should be deducted from FMNEs’ general pool of income 
only if all nations employ uniform depreciation rates. I assume that 
nations do not employ such uniform rates. Therefore, tax depreciation 
expenses should not be deducted from the general pool of FMNEs’ 
income but from the income allocated to every state. 
Second, tax authorities should determine FMNEs’ (aggregated) 
economic, tangible asset, and intangible asset values. The economic 
value would be determined according to the stock price of FMNEs. 
The aggregated value of FMNEs’ tangible assets (Tangibles’ Value) 
would be determined by their financial accounting “book” value.122 
The aggregated value of FMNEs’ financial, intangible, and human 
capital assets is the difference between the economic value and the 
Tangibles’ Value (Residual Value).123 It would be calculated by 
subtracting FMNEs’ Tangibles’ Values from their economic values. 
The feasibility of this valuation process depends upon the percentage 
of FMNEs registered as public companies (which most major FMNEs 
are). Information about FMNEs’ assets could also be obtained from 
financial regulators, which, especially in the case of banks, closely 
monitor FMNEs’ holdings. 
However, with regard to payroll, tax authorities may find that 
determining the compensation for independent contractors is 
administratively difficult. For example, an FMNE hires a janitor, a 
guard, a secretary, and a driver through independent contractors. 
Besides their labor expenses, independent contractors have 
depreciation of tangible property as well as operational and 
managerial expenses, for which they require compensation from the 
FMNE. More importantly, contractors may assume the liabilities for 
risks associated with the services they provide and may require the 
FMNE to further compensate them for that. Some of these indirect 
 
 122 This would comprise purchase value minus depreciated amounts as 
determined by GAAP (and not by tax depreciation). 
 123 This method is similar to the one of Treas. Reg. § 1.861–9T(h) (2006). 
Corporations are subject to an interest deduction allocation under Code section 
864(e) that requires them to allocate their income deductions according to an asset 
formula. This regulation allows corporations to elect their deductions using the FMV 
of their assets rather than by their tax base. Corporations wishing to elect this method 
must come up with a way to determine the value of their intangibles. They do so by 
using this notion of residual value. 
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employees may work for the same independent contractor at a 
number of locations and receive different salaries for each of these 
part-time jobs. In this scenario, the FMNE and tax authorities would 
find it difficult to insulate the compensation for the labor factor of 
independent contractors. 
A number of approaches to this problem may be taken. The 
formulary payroll factor could include independent contractor 
compensation. This solution requires taxpayers and tax authorities to 
bear compliance and administrative costs associated with insulating 
compensation for labor factor paid to independent contractors. 
Alternatively, the payroll calculation could exclude independent 
contractors altogether. This would allow FMNEs to manipulate the 
payroll factor by sourcing out as many functions as they can (e.g., 
support staff) to outside contractors in high-tax jurisdictions. 
Under the framework developed in Part IV.B, this article suggests 
a payroll definition that is reasonably accurate and easy to administer 
and that would limit FMNE planning opportunities. One possible 
approach is that the payroll factor should only include compensation 
for professional employees. This would include employees engaged in 
front and back office activities (e.g., creating and monitoring loans, 
marketing, and dealing). Admittedly, this requires taxpayers and tax 
authorities to agree upon a classification of professional employees. 
However, because the financial sector is heavily regulated, this effort 
is manageable, and has been addressed by the OECD in its proposed 
branch allocation rules.124 The payroll factor should exclude the 
support staff of FMNEs (e.g., secretaries and administrative 
assistants), even though the work of skilled support staff is a 
meaningful contribution to FMNE profitability. The article justifies 
the exclusion of supporting staff by pointing to FMNEs’ ability to 
contract out their functions to avoid taxes. 
This arrangement adheres to the objectives set by the article. The 
reliance on employees reduces the difficulty of extracting the 
compensation for labor from services rendered by independent 
contractors. The work of professional employees could be perceived 
as providing the core of FMNEs income generating activities — thus, 
it provides a good indicator to relative volumes of their activities in 
different jurisdictions. For business reasons, FMNEs are much less 
 
 124 OECD, supra note 77, at 76–77, 127–34 (providing a comprehensive 
description of the different professional positions and functions undertaken by 
FMNEs engaged in banking and securities trading). 
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likely to outsource jobs performed by professional employees.125 
Additionally, their compensation would be easy to observe. 
This article may err in two important respects. Tax authorities can 
significantly reduce the compliance burden of determining 
compensation for labor paid indirectly by FMNEs to independent 
contractors by making some simplifying assumptions.126  Additionally, 
FMNEs may be able to source out considerably more functions in 
high-tax jurisdictions than the article assumes they can. This would 
allow them to manipulate the payroll factor. If either of these 
possibilities is true, tax authorities may find it better to calculate the 
payroll factor according to the compensation for labor paid to all 
employees and independent contractors. Successfully incorporating 
this broad notion of employees depends on the nature of the 
simplifying assumptions that this type of system would make. 
Leases of tangible property pose a problem similar to the one of 
independent contractors. To reduce the income allocated to high-tax 
jurisdictions, FMNEs may lease instead of own tangibles there. Since 
both the financing and leasing expenses are deductible from FMNEs’ 
general pool of income, leasing may be a profitable strategy for 
reducing taxes. To deal with this problem, FMNEs should report the 
economic value of their tangible-property leases as part of their 
Tangibles’ Value. For example, assume an FMNE leases a big 
complex in London for a period of 20 years. The lease payments, just 
like the mortgage it would have paid if it purchased the complex, are 
deductible from its general pool of income. Accordingly, the FMNE 
would have to add the FMV of the lease — meaning how much a third 
party would pay right now for the right to lease the building for 20 
years.127 This figure should be added to the Tangibles’ Value of the 
FMNE. 
Third, FMNEs’ net taxable income should be bifurcated 
according to the ratio of its Tangibles’ Value and Residual Value. 
Each of the portions would be deemed to reflect the financial income 
 
 125 Outsourcing these professionals entails bigger business risks (having sensitive 
information leaked out and high staff turnover), and would prohibit FMNEs from 
supplying these highly-compensated (and highly-taxed) employees with certain 
benefits, which are typically tax-subsidized. 
 126 Such simplifying assumptions may categorize all payments made to 
independent contractors as compensation for labor. To avoid inflating the payroll 
factor, FMNEs should discount a fixed (and arbitrary) percentage of these payments 
from the payroll factor. 
 127 Tax authorities can easily determine the FMV of the lease by determining the 
net present value of the lease payments. 
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generated from each type of asset. One would expect that for most 
FMNEs the income attributed to intangible assets would be 
considerably greater. This is appropriate because, as explained earlier, 
the lion’s share of FMNEs’ value is generated by their ability to 
provide financial services and to manage financial assets — an ability 
that is largely invested in their workforces and their adroitness. It is 
the qualifications of this workforce that allow FMNEs to elicit profits 
by efficiently internalizing the different risks associated with financial 
activities. Nevertheless, it is important to have the Tangibles’ Value 
component because the depreciation of tangible assets should be 
deducted from the income allocated to each country and not from 
FMNEs’ net taxable income. Additionally, as discussed in detail in the 
subsequent part, the Tangibles’ Value is crucial for extending the 
Proposal to allow formulary allocation of MNEs’ financial income. 
Fourth, tax authorities would employ two allocation formulas to 
determine the income attributable to each jurisdiction. The portion of 
income attributed to Tangibles’ Value would be allocated to each 
jurisdiction according to the relative Tangibles’ Value a given FMNE 
has in that jurisdiction. By the same token, the portion of income 
attributed to the Residual Value would be allocated to each 
jurisdiction according to the relative percentage of the overall payroll 
expenses paid by a given FMNE in it. 
Finally, once FMNEs’ income is allocated among jurisdictions, 
every jurisdiction may allow FMNEs to deduct expenses that were not 
included in the computation of their net taxable incomes. This would 
include expenses that are contingent on the specific location: 
depreciation of tangible assets and tax expenditures. 
The following example illustrates how the Proposal works (all 
figures in this example are in millions of United States dollars). CBH 
is a profitable FMNE traded on the London Stock Exchange. In a 
given fiscal year, CBH had a net taxable income of $1000, which it had 
to allocate among its headquarters, located in country A, and foreign 
branches located in countries B and C. CBH’s stock was sold under 
the aggregated market value of $10,000. Its Tangibles’ (book) Value 
was $1000 and its Residual Value $9000 (which is the difference 
between CBH’s market value and its Tangibles’ Value). The 
Tangibles’-Residual Values ratio in that given year was 1:9. 
Accordingly, 10% of CBH’s net taxable income ($100) would be 
sourced according to the relative percentage of Tangibles’ Value in 
each jurisdiction, and 90% ($900) would be sourced according to the 
relative payroll paid in each jurisdiction. In the present example, a 
total of $6300 respresented annual payroll payments of CBH, paid in 
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each of those jurisdictions according to the following distribution: 
$4200 at CBH headquarters in country A, $1400 at the branch in 
country B, and $700 at the branch in country C. The numerical 
example provided in figure #3 can help elucidate this mechanism. 
FIGURE 3.  CBH’S INCOME ALLOCATION UNDER THE PROPOSAL 
 
The Proposal makes a clear distinction between the fiscal and 
legal ownerships of financial assets. For tax purposes, an FMNE 
subsidiary could be allocated more or fewer financial assets than it is 
perceived to legally own according to other legal doctrines. This tax 
determination should not affect other legal regimes (e.g., financial 
regulations, corporate insolvency), in which the geographic allocation 
of financial assets within FMNEs may bear significance. 
The unitary system is a territorial system that taxes FMNEs’ 
income once at the source level. Under the Proposal, no intra-FMNE 
flows of capital resources are subject to any residence tax cost or to 
withholding taxes. Taxes on FMNEs’ dividend distributions to their 
shareholders may be subject to tax according to each nation’s tax 
policy. 
The Proposal, like any unitary system, raises a number of 
problems,128 some of which result from this article’s attempt to 
 



















 Country C 
 Country A 
 Country B 
CBH’s Aggregated Figures 
1. Total Income (TI): $1000 
2. Market Value (MV): $10,000 
3. Tangibles’ Value (TV): $1000 
4. Residual Value (RV): $9000 
5. Total Payroll (TP): $6300 
6. Total Tangibles’ Income (TTI): $100 




1. Tangibles’ Income: $50 
2. Residual Income: $600 
 
Branch B’s Income 
3. Tangibles' income: $20 
4. Residual income: $200 
 
Branch C’s Income 
5. Tangibles’ Income: $30 
6. Residual Income: $100 
 
 Tangibles’ Income                       Residual Income 
CBH 100 = TTI = 1*(1000/10,000) =  
TI*(TV/MV) 
0.9b = TRI = 1*(9000/10,000) = TI*(RV/MV) 
Headquarters 50 = (500/1000)*0.1 = (HTV/TV)*TTI 600 = (4200/6300)*0.9 = (HP/TP)*TRI 
Branch B 20 = (200/1000)*0.1 = (BTV/TV)*TTI 200 = (1400/6300)*0.9 = (BP/TP)*TRI 
Branch C 30 = (300/1000)*0.1 = (CTV/TV)*TTI 100 = (700/6300)*0.9 = (CP/TP)*TRI 
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introduce a unitary setting in an insufficiently integrated political 
setting. First, and most notably, the Proposal’s emphasis on 
compensation for labor as a sourcing benchmark neglects the problem 
of different wage structures in various countries. Thus, the Proposal 
skews the revenue flow toward the richer countries because of their 
higher wage scales. This arrangement may seem unfair, and thus 
significantly reduces the political plausibility of the Proposal. To 
prevent this, all payroll formulary components would have to include 
controls for cost of living.129  Similarly, the assets formula would need 
controls for the consumption value of money in various jurisdictions. 
The degree to which these considerations should be taken into 
account is a complicated topic with profound distributive implications. 
This issue transcends the scope of this article and is deferred to future 
papers. 
The Proposal’s emphasis on payroll requires special treatment for 
employees working in a number of jurisdictions. This problem is 
magnified in the case of highly mobile senior managers, whose salaries 
may significantly skew the sourcing of FMNEs’ income. An extreme 
example of why this may be problematic is an FMNE which in a given 
(profitable) fiscal year paid 10% of its payroll to its top twenty 
executives. In that same year, most of these executives spent more 
time than usual in low-tax jurisdictions. A potential solution to these 
extreme cases of abuse would be to avoid attributing management 
salaries to the payroll factor of any specific location, when the total 
percentage of their salary exceeds a certain relative percentage of the 
total payroll. This arrangement treats the highly compensated human 
capital of these managers as owned solely on the level of the FMNEs, 
thus preventing the relocation of managers from influencing FMNEs’ 
corporate tax liability. 
Additionally, while this article firmly maintains that payroll is the 
most reliable proxy for allocating FMNE income, adopting it poses 
significant political problems. By tying the sourcing of FMNEs to the 
payroll as a proxy for their rents from intangibles, the Proposal 
imposes an implicit tax on labor. Some of the distorting mechanisms 
of this implicit tax would be reduced by the uniform application of the 
Proposal and by the inability of FMNEs to substitute insider human 
capital expertise. FMNEs would not be able to escape these costs 
 
Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level, 13 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 2113, 2141 (Dec. 23, 1996). 
 129 Kathleen Matthews, U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss APAs in the Global 
Trading Context; Advance Pricing Agreements, 8 TAX NOTES INT’L 1362, 1363 (May 
23, 1994). 
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given their dependency upon skilled workforces operating from high-
tax countries. Once most of the key players are subject to similar 
costs, none is placed in a competitive disadvantage in comparison to 
the others. Like many other costs,130 the implicit tax costs on labor 
would become part of the costs attached to conducting business in the 
financial sector. Uniform application of the payroll factor would 
therefore impose a tax on the financial sector as a whole, but would 
not create huge variations within that sector. Countries can control 
what they may see as the negative impact of this implicit labor tax by 
adjusting the corporate income tax rate they impose on FMNEs.131 
Nevertheless, due to the high level of unemployment in some high-tax 
Western countries, the Proposal’s emphasis on payroll as a dominant 
formulary factor is bound to be extremely controversial. While this 
concern does not defeat the article’s argument, it suggests that 
promoting the Proposal would be an uphill battle. 
Even if the income tax base of FMNEs were to be harmonized via 
a multilateral agreement, a number of key issues would still have to be 
left to the discretion of each country. This is true especially with 
respect to tax expenditures (e.g., charitable donations). Leaving these 
issues outside the unitary realm is crucial. Otherwise, countries will 
have incentives to inflate the tax expenditure deductions knowing that 
they are deducted from FMNEs’ aggregated net taxable incomes and 
not directly from their own revenues. Because only a murky line 
distinguishes tax expenditures from tax base attributes, policymakers 
may find it analytically difficult to delineate a guiding principle for 
what should be left to each country’s discretion. 
Determining the contours of tax expenditures is particularly 
complex in those cases where tax expenditures are inherently related 
to FMNE business conduct, e.g., R&D tax subsidies and accelerated 
depreciation. While there is no easy-line-drawing solution, it is 
important to note that the current system is not free from these 
dilemmas. To the contrary, tax authorities have a difficult time 
confronting the ability of MNEs to incur tax expenditures in high-tax 
jurisdictions while reporting income in low-tax jurisdictions. This gave 
rise to cumbersome and costly mechanisms intended to limit the 
source deductibility of these expenditures.132 
 
 130 The key issue here is the CAR requirements, which are imposed with some 
uniformity across the different financial sectors in Western countries. 
 131 Under the Proposal, countries would be free to set any corporate tax rate on 
FMNEs — this would include the right to subject them to lower corporate tax rate 
with regard to other corporations. 
 132 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17 (1995). 
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Although the article refrains from providing a comprehensive 
answer to this issue, its Proposal is not inferior to the current tax 
arrangement. The article’s principled position is, however, that the 
concept of tax expenditures should be construed broadly. This is 
essential to prevent unfair tax base competition in which sovereigns 
give accelerated deductions, knowing that they would be deducted 
from FMNEs’ net taxable income and not from the income attributed 
directly to them. 
Finally, if strictly applied, cases may arise in which the Proposal’s 
unitary income allocation system may result in compliance and 
administrative costs that would render its application inefficient. 
Accordingly, the Proposal should have a de minimis rule that exempts 
small FMNEs and/or FMNEs with only minor foreign operations. 
While the Proposal should by no means be subject to FMNE election, 
it should be considered a mandatory default. FMNEs with special 
business structures would have the opportunity to enter into 
agreements with tax authorities to select the proper allocation 
techniques according to which their income should be allocated. This 
arrangement resembles the current Advanced Pricing Agreement 
(APA) process,133 with the exception that it puts tax authorities in a 
superior bargaining position when entering into such agreements. 
D.  An Assessment of the Proposal 
There are three benchmarks according to which the Proposal 
should be assessed. The first refers to the likelihood that its 
implementation would reduce FMNEs’ ability to use their internal 
financial flows to avoid taxes. The second refers to whether the 
 
 133 In an APA, taxpayers elect to negotiate in advance the type of transfer-pricing 
method to which they will be subjected. The APA alternative is primarily election by 
taxpayers, which, like FMNEs, have integrated cross-border operations, are exposed 
to uncommon risks or employ unique pricing techniques. Those taxpayers often use 
the APA method to curtail compliance costs associated with having tax authorities 
continuously scrutinize and challenge their pricing methods. See Diane M. Ring, On 
the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advanced Pricing Agreements and the Struggle 
to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143 (2000). It 
would likely prove difficult to advocate the use of APAs as a broad solution to the 
problem of FMNEs because of their voluntariness and particularity. In light of the tax 
avoidance potential of FMNEs and their prominent role in the global economy, the 
difficulty of auditing them should not be sporadically resolved on an ad-hoc basis. 
Kelvin K. Leung, Note, Taxing Global Trading: An Appropriate Testing Ground for 
Formula Apportionment?, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 201, 204–05, 228–30 (1992); see 
generally Richard McAlonan et al., Annual Report Provides Transparency Into APA 
Process, 115 TAX NOTES 1283 (June 25, 2007). 
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Proposal reduces the IITR’s compliance costs, administrative costs, 
and inefficiencies. The third is whether the sourcing approximation of 
the unitary system achieves an overall intuitive sourcing result. 
As mentioned in Part II.C, there are three main avenues of abuse 
— deferral, excessive repatriation of foreign tax credits, and income 
shifting through related party transactions — all of which would be 
eliminated under the Proposal. As a territorial system in which all 
income is taxed only once, at source, the Proposal has no resident 
taxation and derivatively no tax credit manipulation or problems of 
deferral. The unitary rules disregard intra-FMNE transactions and 
thus eliminate FMNEs’ ability to engage in income shifting. 
Opponents of the Proposal may nevertheless argue that the 
tradeoff is not that simple. At least in the case of deferral and credit 
manipulation, the remedy offered by the Proposal throws the baby out 
with the bathwater because it comes at the price of waiving FMNEs’ 
residence taxation. This could arguably incentivize FMNEs to shift 
their activities to low-tax jurisdictions. 
The answer to this objection is multilayered. As the author wrote 
in a different paper,134 to date, residence taxes result in less revenue 
than a (more territorial) dividend exemption tax system with 
equivalent tax rate would raise. This is because countries employing 
residence taxation do not impose residency taxes on foreign 
subsidiaries; rather they levy their taxes only upon repatriation of 
those subsidiaries’ earnings. In the case of the United States, the use 
of hybrid entities permitted by the “check the box” regulations allows 
many MNEs to avoid almost all residency taxes. To date, a growing 
number of countries have been exploring the possibility of altering tax 
legislation to establish more territorial tax systems. Given this, the 
possibility that in the foreseeable future policymakers will introduce a 
more robust residency taxation to deal with the problems of excessive 
credit repatriation or with deferral seems unlikely in my opinion. 
Hence, while strong normative arguments in favor of residency 
taxation exist,135 from a practical perspective, there seems little reason 
to hold fast to residency taxation for FMNEs. 
From a normative perspective, this article maintains that tax 
corporate residency is an analytically flawed concept. The impersonal 
nature of corporations allows them to manipulate their tax residency. 
Furthermore, corporate tax residency status bears only negligible 
 
 134 See Benshalom, supra note 82, at 633–34. 
 135 See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax 
Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391 (2003); Peroni et al., supra note 89. 
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operational or (pre-tax) economic consequences.136 As best 
manifested through the inversion phenomena discussed briefly in Part 
III.B.1, supra, United States MNEs exercised their entrepreneurial 
rights to expatriate to offshore low-tax jurisdictions simply by 
reincorporating there. This allowed the MNEs that were formerly tax 
residents of the United States to avoid completely United States 
residence taxation while continuing to relish (almost) exactly the same 
United States market and infrastructure benefits as before they 
changed residency classification. The following table summarizes a 
comparative evaluation of various parameters between the Proposal 
and the current regime. 
TABLE 2.  A COMPARED ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL  
AND CURRENT FMNE TAX REGIME 
 Current Article’s Proposal 
1. Deferral Very high N.A. 
2. Excessive tax credit 
repatriation 
Very high N.A. 
3. Income shifting by 
related transactions 
Very high Very low 
*On a scale from “very high” to “very low,” the lower ratings in the table are the 
preferential ones. 
The second criterion according to which the Proposal should be 
evaluated is whether it reduces compliance costs and the economic 
deadweight of the corporate income tax. As the author has written 
extensively elsewhere,137 unitary systems are almost certain to perform 
better on both accounts. First, the shift to a formulary system reduces 
compliance associated with FMNEs’ need to contractually delineate 
transactions according to transfer-pricing consideration with the 
arm’s-length standard. By the same token, the shift to a unitary system 
reduces tax authorities’ administrative costs. As a result, the audit 
process is bound to become less arbitrary because the audit 
consequences of FMNEs would depend on where productive assets 
are located and not upon the outcomes of the audit lotteries.138 Put 
differently, the unitary system is a legitimate allocation tool even 
though it does not aim to measure and allocate income with perfect 
precision. This legitimacy is anchored in the failure of the arm’s-length 
alternative to offer any more precise allocation results. 
 
 136 See Graetz, supra note 8, at 320. 
 137 Benshalom, supra note 82, at 689–94. 
 138 The audit lottery refers to the chance that a specific taxpayer will be audited 
in any given fiscal year. 
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The shift to a unitary system also reduces the economic 
deadweight of the income tax in one significant way. By disregarding 
intra-group financial flows and services, the Proposal removes all tax 
obstacles on these transactions. It allows management greater 
resiliency in employing resources without giving heed to tax 
consequences. Critics of the shift to a unitary system may nevertheless 
argue that this gain in efficiency comes at the great expense of 
FMNEs placing more facilities and workforces according to tax 
considerations. The factual answer to whether the shift to a unitary 
system results in an efficiency net gain or loss is speculative, factual, 
and difficult to determine. The article contends, however, that there is 
a normative difference between the post-investment tax distortions it 
seeks to alleviate and the pre-investment tax distortions its critics may 
claim the Proposal enhances. 
Unlike the ethos of capital-exporting neutrality, the article does 
not seek to prevent FMNEs from taking corporate tax considerations 
into account when deciding where to place workforce and production 
facilities. Corporate taxes are yet another type of state-imposed costs 
that should be assessed by entrepreneurs in light of their projected 
returns. Through the corporate taxes, sovereigns price corporations’ 
use of their infrastructures. Imposing a worldwide corporate tax to 
attain investment neutrality is equivalent to imposing worldwide labor 
market regulations to attain such neutrality. Hence, MNEs should 
legitimately give heed to all tax considerations prior to investing in a 
given location. 
The article does however seek to reduce post-investment tax 
distortions. This requires that once an investment has been made — 
meaning that tangible properties have been purchased and a 
workforce has been created — the tax price would be fixed to prevent 
FMNEs from structuring operations solely to manipulate their tax 
liabilities. The shift to a unitary system allows a substantial efficiency 
gain because FMNEs would not be able to change the ratio between 
earned income and tax liability by channeling mobile assets and 
activities through low-tax jurisdictions. They will therefore have the 
incentive to increase their pre-tax earnings as much as possible. 
Moreover, under a unitary system, there are no tax obstacles for doing 
so: FMNEs could freely arrange their financial assets and corporate 
structure without incurring tax liability upon intra-group transactions 
such as earnings repatriation. This would allow them to invest their 
assets in those places with the highest pre-tax return. Once FMNEs 
decide to locate some of their workforce and tangible property in a 
specific jurisdiction, they become indifferent to the tax rates in 
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jurisdictions where their financial assets are located. Thus, once the 
investments are made, there are no tax obstacles preventing the 
efficient investment of FMNE financial resources. 
The third criterion is whether allocating FMNEs’ net taxable 
income through a (primarily) payroll-based appropriation formula is 
intuitively correct. In some cases, the Proposal’s allocation seems 
unintuitive. For example, when a new foreign branch or subsidiary is 
established, it often takes some time for it to generate profitability. In 
such instances, the averaging function of the Proposal’s allocation 
formula may seem inadequate. If the FMNE has a positive net taxable 
income, some of it would be allocated to the new branch or subsidiary. 
On the other side of the continuum, the Proposal’s allocation seems to 
produce appropriate sourcing results in cases of global dealing, where 
different branches of a specific FMNE actively trade financial 
instruments pooled into a single book. The answer to whether the 
balance struck by the Proposal is appealing depends by and large on 
what one thinks of the “abusiveness” of income shifting and the use of 
the arm’s-length benchmark. This article’s analysis established that 
FMNE income is generated by financial assets and human capital, that 
payroll is a good indicator for human capital, and that FMNEs have 
almost full flexibility in structuring their intra-group financial flows 
and holdings. If one accepts these conclusions, then the averaging 
result of the Proposal’s formula should seem appropriate. 
By way of conclusion, FMNEs are unique in the sense that they 
are operating in an integrated market and deal primarily with mobile 
intangible assets. FMNE related transactions often have no market 
comparables and therefore could not be coherently attributed to any 
specific jurisdiction. The Proposal’s unitary setting is by no means a 
panacea. However, to evaluate its merits one must consider the 
alternative it seeks to replace. The article maintains firmly that the 
key to this evaluation lies in the accelerating level of integration in 
financial markets. If the Proposal is not adopted, the high levels of 
cross-border and cross-sector integration would eventually make it 
completely impossible for tax authorities to break down affiliated 
transactions according to an arm’s-length standard. This inevitably 
renders the income tax regime more cumbersome, costly, inefficient, 
and inequitable. Additionally, although the Proposal waives sovereign 
ability to levy residency tax on FMNEs, it is important to remember 
that, to date, residence taxation has not been a net revenue gain 
regime but one which, on top of its complexities, levies fewer revenues 
than alternative dividend exemption regimes. Bearing this in mind, 
the Proposal, if adopted, is likely to outperform the current sourcing 
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techniques, in the case of FMNEs, in almost every respect. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This article identifies the core attributes that make financial 
income so difficult to tax under existing IITR arm’s-length 
conventions: mobility and fungibility. It further points out that in the 
context of affiliated financial transactions, this combination is 
horrendous because there is no “correct” market financial structure 
upon which tax authorities can rely as a benchmark. Related parties 
can therefore structure financial transactions in many different, 
economically equivalent, forms to attain tax avoidance preferences by 
using readily available tax planning expertise. The view that the 
special attributes of financial income render irrelevant the existing 
legal structures governing the taxation of affiliated financial 
transactions is gaining traction among tax policymakers in the United 
States and other Western countries. Hence, with regard to financial 
income, legislators, tax authorities, and the OECD have become more 
willing to deviate from the arm’s-length standard in favor of more 
formulary solutions. 
This article advances a unitary solution in the context of FMNEs. 
It suggests that their income could be adequately sourced through a 
formula that relies on the value of their tangible assets and intangible 
human capital assets in each jurisdiction. It offers difficult to 
manipulate indicators that would help determine the geographic 
locations of these assets and explains why the adoption of its solution 
is feasible politically and administratively. Moreover, this article 
stresses that MNEs’ financial income should be sourced, as a matter of 
principle, in accordance with where their tangible assets and labor is 
employed and not according to the contractual attributes of the 
transaction. 
In a future paper,139 I would take this notion a step further and 
examine how MNEs’ financial income should be formulary-sourced. 
Unlike FMNEs, MNEs have some financial income (gains or losses), 
but generate mostly non-financial income. This extension of the 
proposal would therefore require a careful definition of what 
 
 139 Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises, 28 
VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
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comprises financial income. Additionally, unlike FMNEs, MNEs 
operate from a wide rage of countries and may have a very 
complicated ownership structure. Accordingly, the proposal for 
formulary sourcing MNEs’ financial income offers a set of ideas about 
how it could be successfully implemented even in the absence of 
multilateral consensus and even in complex MNE group ownership 
structures

